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IDEOLOGY “ALL THE WAY DOWN”?
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Gregory C. Sisk*
Michael Heise**
As part of our ongoing empirical examination of religious liberty decisions
in the lower federal courts, we studied Establishment Clause rulings by
federal court of appeals and district court judges from 1996 through 2005.
The powerful role of political factors in Establishment Clause decisions
appears undeniable and substantial, whether celebrated as the proper integration of political and moral reasoning into constitutional judging,
shrugged off as mere realism about judges being motivated to promote
their political attitudes, or deprecated as a troubling departure from the
aspirational ideal of neutral and impartial judging. In the context of
Church and State cases in federal court, it appears to be ideology much, if
not all, of the way down.
Alternative ideology variables of Party of Appointing President and Common Space Scores were highly significant and the magnitude of the effect
on case outcomes was dramatic. Holding other variables constant, Democratic-appointed judges were predicted to uphold Establishment Clause
challenges at a 57.3% rate, while the predicted probability of success fell
to 25.4% before Republican-appointed judges. Thus, an Establishment
Clause claimant’s chances for success were 2.25 times higher before a
judge appointed by a Democratic president than before a judge appointed
by a Republican president. Using Common Space Scores as a proxy for
ideology, the most liberal judges were predicted to approve such claims at
a 62.5% rate, compared with acceptance by the most conservative judges
only 23.2% of the time.
A religious–secular divide that has become associated with the two major
political parties increasingly characterizes our national political discourse
about the proper role of religion and religious values in public life. The federal courts may be sliding down into the same “God Gap” that has opened
and widened between left and right and between Democrat and Republican
in the political realm. Because of its notorious lack of clarity and a
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consequently low level of law formality, the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause doctrine has become an attractive nuisance for political judging.
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Introduction
When asked during her confirmation hearings whether hard cases must
be decided by “what is in the judge’s heart,”1 Justice Elena Kagan insisted

1. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103 (2010)
[hereinafter Kagan Nomination Hearing] (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary).
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that adjudication by the Supreme Court of both constitutional and statutory
cases is “law all the way down.”2
In academic circles, this assertion was met mostly by cynicism about the
candor of Justice Kagan’s answer or an attempt to reconstruct her answer to
fit a nontraditional definition of what constitutes “law.”3 A few progressive
law professors sought to rehabilitate the answer by shifting Justice Kagan’s
plain citation of a conventional understanding of “law”4 toward an alternative conception of “law” that embraces political judgments about
constitutional provisions that purportedly incorporate abstract moral principles.5 In so doing, one defender of Justice Kagan’s response hastened to
dismiss as “ludicrous” any suggestion “that a judge can always decide
what the law requires without calling on any moral or political convictions
or any theory of social justice.”6 By contrast, more conservative academic
2. Id. (statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor Gen. of the United States).
3. See Eric J. Segall, Commentary, What Elena Kagan Could Have and Should Have
Said (and Still Have Been Confirmed), 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 535, 538 (2010) (arguing that
Justice Kagan should have said that “the ‘law’ often runs out in difficult constitutional cases,”
and therefore “a Justice has no choice but to bring her personal values, experiences, and
judgments to the process”); Ann Althouse, The Kagan Hearings, Althouse (June 29, 2010,
7:58 AM), http://althouse.blogspot.com/2010/06/kagan-hearings.html (“Kagan [was] forthright: ‘It’s law all the way down.’ . . . A good follow-up question would have been: But do you
think that law includes a component that comes from deep values and human empathy? The
secret answer is: Yes.”). But see Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases,
26 J.L. & Pol. 123, 171 (2011) (arguing that even when the law leaves significant room for
judges to reach conflicting conclusions in constitutional cases, judges are obliged to “shun[]
reliance upon purely personal, non-legal reasons when making their discretionary judgments”
and thus such “rulings are, in Justice Kagan’s words, ‘law all the way down’ ”).
4. See Kagan Nomination Hearing, supra note 1, at 173 (statement of Elena Kagan,
Solicitor Gen. of the United States) (“[S]o to say that something is law all the way down,
which is absolutely the case, [is to say] that it would be completely improper for a judge to
import personal, or moral, or political preferences into the occasion.”); see also Keith J.
Bybee, Will the Real Elena Kagan Please Stand Up? Conflicting Public Images in the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 1 Wake Forest J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 137, 147 (2011)
(“[Leading newspapers covering the nomination] clearly conveyed the impression that judicial
decision making is a matter of impartial principle, and did so primarily by reporting the words
of Kagan herself.”); Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s
Cult of Celebrity, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1255, 1255 (2010) (“Nominees of both parties now
present themselves as modest and humble servants of the law, respectful of existing precedent
and without a desire to move the law in any particular direction.”).
5. Ronald Dworkin, The Temptation of Elena Kagan, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 19,
2010, at 35, 36 (arguing that it is “ ‘law all the way down,’ ” but because some constitutional
clauses are drafted in “abstract moral language,” discovering and applying the law requires “a
judge [to] rely on moral conviction”); see also Posting of Mark Tushnet, William Nelson
Crowell Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu (June 29, 2010),
http://www.mail-archive.com/conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu/msg20140.html (“[O]f course judging is law all the way down. . . . Of course that doesn't mean that it's not, to take two
possibilities, politics and empathy all the way down as well—which is why the answer, while
accurate, isn’t all that informative.”).
6. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 35; see also Lerner & Lund, supra note 4, at 1256–57
(“In the legal academy, this traditional ideal [of judging] is considered laughable at best and
pernicious at worst.”).
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commentators, though attracted to a traditional focus on “law” as the essence of judging, remained skeptical that Justice Kagan’s stated
commitment to nonpolitical and restrained judging was authentic and accurately predicted her future judicial behavior.7
Based on our recently completed empirical study of Establishment
Clause decisions in the lower federal courts, skepticism about the ability of
judges to separate political preconceptions from judicial declarations in a
high-visibility area with low-rule formality may be warranted. Whether celebrated as a proper integration of political and moral reasoning into
constitutional judging, shrugged off as mere realism about judges being motivated to promote their political attitudes, or deprecated as a troubling
departure from the aspirational ideal of neutral and impartial judging, the
powerful role of political factors in Establishment Clause decisions appears
undeniable and substantial. In the context of federal court claims implicating
questions of Church and State, it appears to be ideology much, if not all, of
the way down.
As part of our ongoing empirical examination of religious liberty decisions in the lower federal courts,8 we study here all digested Establishment
Clause decisions by federal court of appeals and district court judges from
1996 through 2005.9 Not only were our alternative ideology variables of
Party of Appointing President and Common Space Scores highly significant
(at the p < .001 level), but the magnitude of the effect on case outcomes was
dramatic. 10 Holding all other variables constant, Democratic-appointed

7. See Jonathan Alder, The Judiciary Committee Grills Elena Kagan, Response to
Topic A, Wash. Post (June 29, 2010, 1:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/06/29/AR2010062902652.html (“[L]ike successful nominees before
her, [Kagan] erred on the side of caution, not candor. . . .”); Rick Esenberg, No Need
to Pretend—She’s a Liberal, Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, July 3, 2010, http://
www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/97700799.html (arguing that Justice Kagan’s background
and previous statements suggest that she accepts the liberal view that “judicial discretion is
broad” and will “tend to use that discretion to privilege those values emphasized by contemporary progressives”).
8. See Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts (2011) (working paper); Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Perspective, U.
Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Heise & Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial
Decisionmaking]; Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the
Courts: Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1021 (2005)
[hereinafter Sisk, Traditional and Minority Religions in the Courts]; Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures,
99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 743 (2005) [hereinafter Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology]; Gregory C.
Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence
from the Federal Courts (U. of St. Thomas Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 11-23, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917057 [hereinafter Sisk &
Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty]; Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss,
Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom
Decisions, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 491 (2004).
9. See infra Section I.A.
10. See infra Sections I.B.1 and I.B.3.
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judges were predicted to uphold claims challenging government conduct on
Establishment Clause grounds at a 57.3% rate, while the predicted probability of success fell to 25.4% before Republican-appointed judges. Thus, an
Establishment Clause claimant’s chances for success were 2.25 times higher
before a judge appointed by a Democratic president than one appointed by a
Republican president. Using Common Space Scores as a proxy for ideology,
the more liberal judges were predicted to approve such claims at a 62.5%
rate, compared with acceptance by the more conservative judges only 23.2%
of the time.
No other variable—not the judges’ prior legal positions, religion, race,
or gender—proved consistently salient in predicting the outcome of claims
alleging that governmental conduct crossed the supposed line “separating
Church and State” under the Establishment Clause. The statistical significance of a variable measuring precedent (specifically, the reaction of the
lower federal courts to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Agostini v.
Felton11) reassures us that legal guideposts have continuing force, even
when the otherwise malleable doctrine leaves considerable space for extralegal influences on judging.12 Nonetheless, the independent significance and
substantial size effect of alternative party and ideology-score variables remain striking.
In this particular but leading field of constitutional adjudication, our nation’s judges appear to have separated into the same camps as the national
political parties. Since the 1970s, the Democratic Party has become progressively more secular or disassociated from traditional religion and more
strongly associated with a separationist approach toward religion and government. 13 During the same period, the Republican Party has attracted
growing support from persons with high levels of religious activity and has
advocated an accommodationist stance toward religion and religious institutions’ interactions with and influence on government and public policy.
Whether categorized as Democrat-versus-Republican or framed as liberalversus-conservative, a religious–secular divide increasingly characterizes
our national political discourse—and perhaps judicial deliberations as
well—about the proper role of religion and religious values in public life.
Sometimes a singular episode speaks volumes about the general attitude
held within a political–legal movement. Confirmed in the only signed draft
of the speech that is now preserved at the White House, and reported contemporaneously by those who were present when it was delivered, Abraham
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address expressed the fervent hope that a “new birth
of freedom” following the Civil War would be realized by “this nation, under God.”14 But when printing thousands of pamphlets containing leading
constitutional documents, the liberal American Constitution Society opted to
11. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
12. See infra Sections I.B.4 and II.B.3.
13. See infra Section II.A.1.
14. Robert George, God and Gettysburg, First Things, Aug./Sept. 2010, available
at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/07/god-and-gettysburg.
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circulate an earlier, undelivered draft of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address which
omitted the words “under God.” This peculiar choice of an alternative text is
difficult to understand as anything other than the deliberate sanitizing from
the speech of a prominent religious reference.15
On the other end of the political–legal spectrum, one elected state judge
became passionately devoted, above all else, to enshrining a religious symbol in a courthouse. When he rose to head of the state judiciary, he lashed
the wheel of the state court system to steer unerringly toward that end, heedless of the shoals of contrary higher court rulings, and ultimately ran his
own judicial career aground. After this previously “obscure Alabama trial
judge” seized national attention for posting the Ten Commandments and
leading Christian prayers in his courtroom, he “rode the wave of publicity to
election as chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court.”16
Having campaigned as the “Ten Commandments Judge,”17 Chief Justice
Roy Moore installed a two-and-a-half-ton stone monument of the Ten
Commandments at the center of the Alabama courthouse rotunda.18 He defended his display, not merely by reference to the historical importance of
the Ten Commandments in American society, but by emphasizing that the
monument represented “the revealed law of God.”19 When ordered by a federal court of appeals to remove the monument, Chief Justice Moore
pointedly refused, which led to his removal from office by the state judicial
ethics panel.20
Most thoughtful commentators on the left neither doubt nor denigrate
the powerful and appropriate influence of religion on public policy, on matters ranging from the civil rights movement to environmental protection.
And few if any conservative thinkers countenance imposing theological doctrines into public policy, although they value the teachings of religious
traditions on public matters of morality and culture. Nonetheless, despite
what may be substantial agreement among most Americans on general principles, we have seen an increasing tendency in national politics toward
secular egalitarianism on the left and overt religious coalition-building on

15. But see Caroline Frederickson, Debate or Distraction: Why Some Are Fretting
Over the ACS Pocket Constitution, Am. Constitution Soc’y for Law & Pol’y (July 20,
2010), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/debate-or-distraction-why-some-are-fretting-over-theacs-pocket-constitution (rejecting “the claim that ACS deliberately manipulated the texts out
of an alleged anti-God agenda of our organization” and observing that the first document included in the pamphlet, the Declaration of Independence, makes “very clear references to God
and ‘the Creator’ ”).
16. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16 J.L. &
Religion 187, 231–32 (2001).
17. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003), subsequent determination, 347 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003).
18. Id. at 1284.
19. Id. For an exploration of this episode in terms of both conscience and prudence, see
Robert K. Vischer, Professional Identity and the Contours of Prudence, 4 U. St. Thomas L.J.
46, 48–51 (2006).
20. In re Moore, No. 33 (Ala. Ct. Jud. Nov. 13, 2003).
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the right.21 While one side of the political spectrum at times appears intent
on removing all religious influences and even religious references from
public life,22 the other side sometimes appears eager to inject religious
connotations into even the most prosaic of political squabbles.23
In a more judicious manner, but no less real and substantial in effect as
revealed in our empirical study, the federal courts may be sliding down
into the same “God Gap” that has opened and widened between left and
right in the political realm. In our study, we have identified a subject of
adjudication in which the “classic legal tug”24 against personal judicial
preferences or attitudes has failed to take firm hold. Because of the notorious lack of clarity in the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and a consequently low level of law formality, the door to
unrestrained political judging has been thrown wide open.25 With these
untoward consequences, the subjectivity of Establishment Clause doctrine
has passed the point of tolerability.
I. Results of Empirical Study of Establishment Clause
Decisions in the Federal Courts, 1996–2005
A. Summary Description of Our Establishment Clause Decisions
Study and Regression Results
In this study, we conducted an analysis of decisions made by both federal courts of appeals and federal district courts in cases raising constitutional
religious freedom issues.26 For this phase of the study, we created a data
set of all digested decisions by federal district courts and courts of appeals

21. See Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America’s Church-State Problem—
and What We Should Do About It 235 (2005) (“We are, increasingly, a nation divided by
God. Although we all believe in religious liberty and almost no one wants an officially established religion, we cannot agree on what the relation between religion and government should
be.”).
22. See Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-stopper, 3 Common Knowledge 1
(1994), reprinted in Philosophy and Social Hope 168, 169 (1999) (arguing that it should be
seen as “bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy”).
23. See Andrea Stone, Congress Latest Battlefield in Annual “War on Christmas”
Debate, AOL News (Dec. 16, 2010, 9:30 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/12/16/congress
-latest-battlefield-in-annual-war-on-christmas-debate (discussing assertions by Senate Republican leaders that plans for Congress to work through the holiday season were “sacrilegious”
and “disrespect[ful of] one of the two holiest of holidays for Christians” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
24. See Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 200
(2007) (referring to the “classic legal tug” on procedural issues that overrides ideological
preferences).
25. See infra Part II.B.1.
26. Our data set, regression-run results, coding of each decision, coding of each judge,
and coding information may be found at Gregory Sisk & Michael Heise, Empirical Study of
Religious Liberty Decisions Study Data, U. St. Thomas (last visited Jan. 20, 2012), http://
courseweb.stthomas.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.html.
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resolving an Establishment Clause challenge to governmental conduct from
1996 through 2005.27 As the decisions were collected, the direction of each
judge’s ruling, the general factual category of the case, the religious affiliation of the judge, the religious demographics of the judge’s community, the
judge’s ideology, the judge’s race and gender, and various background and
employment variables for the judge were coded.28
As the point of analysis, we examined each judge’s ruling in an
individual case as a “judicial participation.”29 Each district court judge’s
ruling was coded separately, as was each vote by one of the multiple
judges participating on an appellate panel. Accordingly, the primary focus
of our study was the judge rather than the court as an institution or a
collective appellate panel30—that is, we measured the individual response
of each judge to each Establishment Clause claim.
Our decision to include district court judges along with court of appeals
judges in this study, and to code both types of judges in the same way on
merits decisions, warrants explanation. Scholars are conducting important,
cutting-edge research on the district courts through quantitative study of
dockets, developments, and rulings at multiple stages of the civil litigation
process.31 Because typically “the nature of district court judges’ work is
substantially different from that of appellate judges,” these scholars tailor
their empirical research to the distinct institutional setting of the district
court.32 While admiring this important and ongoing work, we determined,
27. In our prior study of 1986–1995 religious liberty decisions, we included only published decisions in our data set. Sisk, Traditional and Minority Religions in the Courts, supra note
8, at 1028, 1034. In so doing, we knowingly “biased our database in favor of decisions that raise
highly visible, controversial, landmark, or difficult questions of religious freedom, or at least issues of
religious freedom that a judicial actor found particularly interesting and thus worthy of publication.”
Id. at 1049. For this 1996–2005 study, we have expanded the data set to include the set of unpublished
but digested opinions available on Westlaw. In addition to 535 judicial participations from published
decisions, our data set includes twenty judge votes from decisions that were digested by Westlaw but
not published in the reporter system. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 26.
28. Every decision was independently coded by both a trained law student and one of
the authors. For more detailed information about our study, data collection, and coding, see
the description published as part of our prior study of religious liberty decisions from 1986 to
1995, Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 8, at 530–54, 571–612. The few changes in the selection of variables and coding from the prior study may be found by reviewing our coding and
coding information. See supra note 26.
29. For further discussion of judicial participations as the data point, see Sisk, Heise &
Morriss, supra note 8, at 539–41.
30. We did, however, control for the Party of Appointing President of the other judges
on a three-judge appellate panel in alternative regression runs, thus conducting a limited exploration of panel effects. See infra Section I.B.2.
31. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104
Nw. U. L. Rev. 853 (2010); Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 83 (2009); James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs
and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61
Vand. L. Rev. 355 (2008); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 223 (2008).
32. Kim et al., supra note 31, at 85.
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for two reasons, that a separate district court-focused and docket-oriented
approach was neither possible nor well suited for this particular study of
religious liberty rulings.
First, our study examines religious liberty decisions from 1996 to 2005,
while the various federal docket and pleading databases are generally reliable only from 2000.33 The restricted search options and limited nature of
case coding in the federal court docket databases, none of which allowed
general searches for all cases raising religious liberty issues, further precluded our effective use of these sources for our study.34 Accordingly, we
placed trial court rulings in the same decisional space as appellate court
rulings, requiring us to focus on merits rulings and not preliminary nonmerits rulings and to include all digested opinions available on Westlaw,
whether or not the opinions had been published in the reporter system.
Second, and more importantly, in the special context of constitutional
rulings, the deferential standard of appellate review that ordinarily is applied
to a trial court’s factual findings is subject to the “constitutional fact” exception for “factual” disputes that go to the core of a constitutional question.35
Trial and appellate judges share parallel responsibilities for resolving a constitutional case, including the central constitutional significance of factual
assertions, precisely “to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury
from having far-reaching legal effects.”36 Accordingly, we concluded that
expanding our empirical study beyond circuit judges to evaluate the behavior of a larger and more inclusive set of lower federal judges has much
merit, especially in the context of constitutional rulings.
Nonetheless, we conducted alternative regression runs to tease out differences in the behavior of district court and court of appeals judges in
Establishment Clause cases. A dummy variable for appellate court decisions was highly significant at nearly the .01 level (or 99% probability
level) in a negative direction, meaning that appellate rulings were less
likely to generate favorable Establishment Clause rulings than were trial
33. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 31, at 877 n.119, 880.
34. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Judging Science: An Essay on the Unscientific Basis of
Beliefs About the Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better Data About Law,
14 J.L. & Pol’y 137, 144–45 (2006) (observing that cases are coded in the federal docket
database PACER for a single type, even if the case involves multiple causes of action); Mary
Whisner, Unanswerable Questions, 100 Law Libr. J. 581, 583 (2008) (noting that the “Nature
of Suit” coding in PACER lacks the detail needed for finding many types of cases).
35. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 n.8 (1987) (responding to the
dissent’s objection that the majority “failed to accord adequate deference to the purported
‘findings’ ” of the trial court by explaining that “any factual findings subsumed in [a constitutional] determination are subject to constitutional fact review” by the appellate court). See
generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985).
36. A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th
Cir. 2002) (“That admixture of fact and law, sometimes called an issue of ‘constitutional fact,’
is reviewed without deference in order to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury
from having far-reaching legal effects.”); see also Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d
1017, 1029 (10th Cir. 2008) (conducting de novo review of district court’s findings on each
part of test for Establishment Clause)
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court rulings. Holding all other independent variables constant, a court of
appeals judge was predicted to rule favorably in an Establishment Clause
case at a rate of 34.4%, as compared to 50.0% for district court judges.
However, the addition of this control variable for appellate rulings did not
alter the significance of any other finding. In addition, we conducted separate regression analyses of district court and court of appeals rulings; we
found few substantive differences, and those that are meaningful are discussed at pertinent points in this Article.
We also acknowledge that several studies have found only a small percentage of district court dispositions to be accompanied by a written
opinion,37 which is the data point for our study. For the high-visibility area
of Establishment Clause challenges to government interaction with religion,
we have reason to believe that the percentage of district court dispositions
with written, even published, decisions is much higher. In a spot check of
100 Establishment Clause complaints produced in a search of the Westlaw
Pleadings database, we found that nearly three-quarters of the cases did lead
to written decisions, most of which were also published. Even so, our search
process undoubtedly captured a larger share of the universe of Establishment Clause dispositions in the courts of appeals than in the district courts.
Accordingly, the reader might fairly place greater weight on our findings
with respect to the courts of appeals than with respect to the district courts.
To be coded as a decision on the merits, a ruling by a district court
judge must have accepted or rejected a particular claim in a manner that
engaged the merits of the claim, even if the ruling issued by the judge was
not a final judgment. Nonmerits justiciability or procedural rulings, however, were excluded.38 For court of appeals decisions, a ruling was coded
as being on the merits if it affirmed or reversed a final judgment by a district court on an Establishment Clause claim or if it remanded the case
after evaluating a significant element of the merits of the claim.39 If a threejudge appellate panel issued a decision that later was reheard en banc (or
became the subject of a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc), each
judge was recorded as having cast only one judicial vote, even if a judge
participated on both the three-judge panel and the en banc panel (or the dissent from the denial of rehearing).40

37. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85
Wash. U. L. Rev. 681, 710 (2007) (finding that 3% of cases in 4 district courts resulted in
written decisions); Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published
Cases: A Research Note, 15 Just. Sys. J. 782, 789–90 (1992) (finding that only 5.3% of cases
brought before a Minnesota district court received published opinions, though the percentage
varied by the type of claim); Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for
Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC
L. Rev. 155, 165 (2006) (finding that 8.7% of district court dispositions were accompanied by
a written opinion while only 2.3% of district court dispositions were published).
38. See Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 8, at 546 (defining a “merits” ruling).
39. See id. at 547–48.
40. See id. at 552–53.

Sisk & Heise FTP 5_B.doc

3/27/2012 9:21 AM

Ideology “All the Way Down”?

May 2012]

1211

The dependent variable was the individual judge’s vote in each case, coded as “1” when the Establishment Clause claim was upheld and “0” when it
was rejected. (Thus, positive coefficients correlate with approval of the claim
and negative coefficients with rejection of the claim.) Because we analyzed
the influences of multiple variables, we adopted multiple regression models.
Because the dependent variable was dichotomous, we applied logistic regression.41 Our two primary models (using different proxies for ideology) were
nearly identical in the percentage of the overall variation explained and
were largely parallel in statistically significant variable correlations.
Our Establishment Clause data set consisted of 555 judicial participations drawn from 238 decisions (133 district court decisions and 105 court
of appeals decisions). The Establishment Clause claim was favorably received by the ruling judge 39.8 percent of the time.42
Table 1.
Regression Analysis for Establishment Clause Judicial
Participations, Federal Courts (1996–2005)
Party of
Appointing
President
Model

Common
Space Score
Model

Case Type:
Private Education

1.493***
(0.396)

1.429***
(0.384)

Public Education—Elementary

0.679
(0.498)

0.639
(0.521)

Public Education—Secondary/
Higher

1.150*
(0.461)

1.164*
(0.456)

Religious Meetings

1.161**
(0.405)

1.126**
(0.392)

Religious Symbols

1.202**
(0.388)

1.169**
(0.419)

Catholic

-0.073
(0.240)

-0.053
(0.236)

Baptist

0.146
(0.556)

0.099
(0.568)

Judge Religion:

41. Id. at 553.
42. In our prior study of lower federal court decisions from 1986 to 1995, claimants
were successful in 42.3 percent of the judicial observations. Id. at 571.
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Common
Space Score
Model

Other Christian

0.181
(0.460)

0.130
(0.507)

Jewish

0.461
(0.421)

0.463
(0.474)

Other

-0.272
(0.525)

-0.337
(0.490)

None

0.190
(0.224)

0.220
(0.261)

Sex (Female)

-0.337
(0.335)

-0.186
(0.280)

African-American

-0.039
(0.304)

0.093
(0.316)

Asian or Latino

-0.369
(0.515)

-0.145
(0.557)

-1.370***
(0.401)
—

—

ABA Rating—Above Qualified

-0.129
(0.156)

-0.097
(0.186)

ABA Rating—Below Qualified

-0.193
(0.231)

-0.242
(0.236)

Seniority on Federal Bench

-0.000
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

Elite Law School

-0.142
(0.222)

-0.083
(0.174)

Military

-0.101
(0.320)

-0.090
(0.310)

Government

-0.094
(0.284)

-0.108
(0.266)

Judge Sex and Race:

Judge Ideology or Attitude:
Party of Appointing President
Common Space Score

-1.541***
(0.479)

Other Judge Characteristics:

Judge Employment Background:
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State or Local Judge

0.267
(0.212)

0.249
(0.206)

Law Professor

0.171
(0.355)

0.163
(0.360)

Community Demographics:
Catholic Percentage

0.024**
(0.009)

0.016
(0.009)

Jewish Percentage

-0.030
(0.027)

-0.029
(0.029)

Adherence Rate

0.007
(0.016)

0.008
(0.015)

Agostini

-0.704*
(0.330)

-0.579
(0.309)

Zelman

0.049
(0.621)

0.030
(0.607)

Year of Decision

0.005
(0.089)

-0.001
(0.084)

(constant)

-11.396
(177.872)

1.306
(166.726)

pseudo R2
percent explained
N

0.119
69.01
555

0.107
68.83
555

Precedent Variables:

Note: Establishment Clause Outcome = 1. Standard error adjusted for twelve
clusters in circuits.43
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

43. In clustering standard errors at the circuit level, we aimed to account for the effect
of circuit precedent and, indirectly, regional variation. Alternatively, we also conducted a regression analysis that clustered standard errors at the judge level (given that several judges
produced more than one judicial participation in our study). Finding no substantive differences, we do not separately report that regression table.
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B. Findings on Association of Variables on Establishment Clause Decisions
1. Party of Appointing President
Researchers applying quantitative methods to the study of the federal
courts long have sought to capture ideological or political influences on attitudes of judicial actors. For decades, the standard political measure for
federal judges was the political party of the president that had appointed the
judge to the bench.44 In the past decade, an alternative proxy for judicial
preferences has taken hold in the political science discipline, which involves
assignment to each judge of a “common space” ideological score, derived
from positions on legislative proposals held by appointing presidents and
home-state senators of the same political party. 45 In the never-ending
search for better metrics of judicial ideology, scholars recently have developed “agnostic” or “behavioral” measures of ideology for the lower
federal courts. These measures are derived directly from the actual voting
behavior of the judges being studied, rather than by projecting the preferences of external political actors or pronouncing decision outcomes as
liberal or conservative.46
As a measure of judicial ideology, the Party of Appointing President
(Republican or Democrat) proxy is the simplest, most commonly used, most
unambiguously reliable (for accurate coding), most frequently verified as a
meaningful and stable influence on judges, and the most easily interpreted.47
Admittedly, this binary measure is too crude and categorical for studies designed to make comparisons of judges’ relative ideologies along a spectrum,
and it uncomfortably imports partisan political presumptions into the judicial realm.48 Nonetheless, we believe it to be valid and well tailored to this
particular study. As explained in Section II.A of this Article, with respect to
44. Donald R. Songer et al., Continuity and Change on the United States
Courts of Appeals 103–04 (2000) (explaining that in studies of “specific linkages between
policy preferences and decision making,” scholars long have employed partisanship as “at
least [a] rough surrogate[] for certain policy preferences”); see also James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 149, 162 (2003) (describing the line
of research since the 1960s indicating “that party affiliation is a significant predictor of voting
patterns by federal judges”) .
45. See infra Section I.B.3.
46. Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should
We Measure It?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 133, 162, 176–83 (2009) (describing behavioral
measures of ideology based on voting by individual judges in sets of cases); Corey Rayburn
Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on
the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1133, 1137–39 (2010) (reporting that
author’s new ideology measure, based on mapping of patterns among judges and identifying
voting blocs, better predicted civil rights outcomes than other measures of ideology).
47. See Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 167–68 (suggesting that “[t]he enduring
popularity of this measure most likely derives from a combination of” how easy it is “both to
observe and to interpret” and the long history of studies finding a “correlation between party
of appointing official and judicial ideology”).
48. For critiques of this and other measures of ideology, many of which we offered in
our own past work, see infra notes 156–159 and accompanying text.
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the increasingly sharp divide on Church and State issues in American politics,49 the political party is the most pertinent political category for our
study.50 For that reason, the parallel Party of Appointing President proxy
variable is the right tool for this job. Moreover, we employed an alternative
ideology measure, the Common Space Scores, in a comparison model51 that
confirmed the robustness of the ideological association found in our study.
For each judge casting a vote in an Establishment Clause case, appointment by a Republican president was coded as “1” and appointment by a
Democratic president as “0.” Of the 555 judicial participations in our study,
314 (56.6 percent) were by Republican-appointed judges and 241 (43.4 percent) were by Democratic-appointed judges.
By convention among social scientists, statistical significance is generally set at the .05 level (or 95 percent probability level), which thus is the
standard by which we declare that an observed correlation between variables
is unlikely to be the result of mere chance.52 In our study, the Party of Appointing President variable is statistically significant at a higher level than the
minimum standard, meaning that our confidence in the finding of association
is also greater. By reporting that the variable for Party of Appointing President
is statistically significant at the .001 level (or 99.9 percent probability level),
we mean that the probability is less than 1 in 1,000 that the observed association between this independent variable and the outcome of Establishment
Clause decisions is a product of random variation.
Still, as Professor Frank Cross reminds us, “[T]he reader should not
place undue importance on a finding of statistical significance, because such
a finding shows a correlation between variables but by itself does not prove
the substantive significance of that correlation.”53 Importantly, Cross emphasizes that “[o]ne must also consider the magnitude of the association.”54 And
in the case of the Party of Appointing President variable in our study, the
effect size55 on the outcome dependent variable is substantial and indeed
dramatic.

49. See infra Section II.A.1–2.
50. Building on our prior work involving religious affiliation influences on federal
judges, we plan to conduct a particularized study in the near future on the interaction between
party and religious affiliation, such as whether Catholic or Jewish judges appointed by Republican presidents respond differently to Establishment Clause claims than those of other
religions appointed by Republican presidents or those of the same religion appointed by Democratic presidents.
51. See infra Section I.B.3.
52. Alan Agresti & Barbara Finlay, Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences 154 (4th ed., 2009) (explaining that social scientists generally “do not regard the
evidence against [the null hypothesis] as strong unless P is very small, say, P < .05 or P <
.01”).
53. Cross, supra note 24, at 4.
54. Id.
55. By “effect size,” we mean a particular “measure of the strength of association between two variables.” See Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex
Offenders, 44 CONN. L. REV. 161, 184 (2011).
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As shown in Figure 1, holding all other independent variables constant
at their means, the predicted probability that a Republican-appointed judge
would vote to uphold an Establishment Clause claim was 25.4%, while the
probability that a Democratic-appointed judge would uphold the claim was
57.3%—a marginal difference of 31.9%. Thus, an Establishment Clause
claimant’s likelihood of success was predicted to be 2.25 times higher before a Democratic-appointed than before a Republican-appointed judge.
Figure 1.
Predicted Probability of Positive Vote by Judge
on Establishment Clause Claim, by Party of Appointing
President (1996–2005)

The vertical lines in Figure 1 represent the 95 percent confidence intervals for these two predictions. By “95 percent confidence interval,”
statisticians mean that the interval is “one within which we are 95 percent
certain that the true variable value falls.”56 As Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin,
and Matthew Schneider explain, “Such is the reality of the statistical world:
We can never be certain about our best guesses (i.e., inferences) because
they themselves are based on estimates. We can, however, report our level of
uncertainty (e.g., a confidence interval) about those guesses.”57
Thus, while our best estimate is that a Republican-appointed judge is
25.4% likely to rule favorably on an Establishment Clause claim, the actual probability could be as low as 19.5% or as high as 31.3%—that is, we
are 95% confident that the true probability value falls inside this interval.
Similarly, while we predict that a Democratic-appointed judge would up56. Robert M. Lawless et al., Empirical Methods in Law 239 (2010).
57. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1811, 1814
(2006).
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hold an Establishment Clause claim 57.3% of the time, the actual probability could be as low as 42.4% or as high as 72.1%. Because the
probability that the comparative values would appear both in the higher
end of the interval for a Republican-appointed judge and in the lower end
of the interval for a Democratic-appointed judge is much lower than 5%,
we are confident that the margin is higher, probably much higher, than the
11.1% difference between the low and high ends of these two confidence
intervals.58
When we examined district court decisions in a separate regression run,
the party variable just barely slipped out of statistical significance (to the
.054 level) while the ideology-score variable dropped well outside significance (above the .25 level). By contrast, in our separate regression run for
court of appeals decisions, both the party and common-space score variables
remained highly significant (at the .001 and .004 levels respectively). Thus,
while some evidence of a partisan influence remains for federal trial judges,
subject to the cautions raised earlier,59 our confidence in the association for
federal appellate judges is stronger, a finding which is consistent with the
hypothesis that appellate judges experience greater freedom of movement in
deciding cases than do trial judges.
When examining non-unanimous decisions by the appellate courts (with
234 observations from 45 out of 105 appellate cases),60 the rates of success
before Republican- and Democratic-appointed judges leaped even further
apart. As shown in Figure 2, holding all other independent variables constant at their means, the predicted probability that a Republican-appointed
appellate judge would vote to uphold an Establishment Clause claim in a
non-unanimous decision was a paltry 13.2%,61 while the probability that a
Democratic-appointed appellate judge would uphold the claim was an
overwhelming 70.5%—a margin of 57.3%.62 When judges in appellate
decisions were divided about the right outcome, the predicted chance of
success for an Establishment Clause claimant was more than five times
greater before a Democratic-appointed judge than before a Republicanappointed one.

58. Looking at the raw frequencies in this study, Democratic-appointed judges upheld
54.7% of Establishment Clause claims and Republican-appointed judges upheld 28.3%. That
the predicted rate after regression and holding other variables constant is only somewhat higher (a margin of 31.9% compared to 26.4%) suggests that the party variable association with
the outcome dependent variable is strong and not substantially affected by other variables in
the model.
59. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
60. The 234 judicial observations in the 45 non-unanimous appellate cases include not
only those cast in three-judge panels but also the more numerous votes cast by judges deciding
Establishment Clause cases after an en banc circuit hearing.
61. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Republicanappointed court of appeals judge in a non-unanimous decision ranges from 7.1% to 19.3%. On
95% confidence intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
62. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Democraticappointed court of appeals judge in a non-unanimous decision ranges from 55.9% to 85.2%.
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Figure 2.
Predicted Probability of Positive Vote by Judge on Establishment
Clause Claim, by Party of Appointing President (Non-Unanimous
Appellate Decisions) (1996–2005)

These findings of a partisan cast to Establishment Clause decisions in
the lower federal courts are consistent with prior empirical studies.
Professors C.K. Rowland and Robert Carp, in their comprehensive 1996
study of district court judges, found a difference between Democratic- and
Republican-appointed judges of 24% on religion cases generally.63 In our
prior study of federal district and court of appeals judges in published
Establishment Clause cases decided between 1986 and 1995, we also found
the Party of Appointing President variable to be statistically significant by a
margin, in terms of raw frequencies, of 18%.64 Looking more closely at the
1986–1995 data, and holding other variables constant, Republicanappointed judges during that period were predicted to rule in favor of an
Establishment Clause claim at a rate of 34.4%, 65 while Democraticappointed judges were predicted to do so 53.3% of the time.66 Thus, while
the finding of a correlation is not new, the divergence between
Republican- and Democratic-appointed federal judges in Church and State
cases appears to be getting wider.

63. C.K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Politics and Judgment in Federal District Courts 40 (1996).
64. Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 767. See also infra notes 256–
260, accompanying text, and Figure 8.
65. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Republicanappointed judge in the 1986–1995 data set ranged from 26.0% to 42.7%.
66. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Democraticappointed judge in the 1986–1995 data set ranged from 41.1% to 65.4%.
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2. Party of Appointing President and Appellate
Panels (Panel Effects)
In the past decade, empirical research into the federal courts of appeals
has turned increasingly to the interactions among judges sitting on panels,
typically measuring differences in decision outcomes by alternating configurations of three-judge panels among judges appointed by presidents of
different parties. The “panel effects” subfield of judicial decisionmaking
studies got its jump-start more than a decade ago with the pioneering works
of Professors Richard Revesz,67 Frank Cross, and Emerson Tiller.68 Both the
Revesz study and the Cross and Tiller study found that the party-based
composition of panels was significantly associated with variations in the
voting behavior of circuit judges reviewing administrative agency actions. In
a study of a larger set of federal appellate cases falling into multiple issue
categories, Cass Sunstein and his collaborators described panel effects in
terms of the following: (1) “ideological amplification,” when a judge sitting
with two other judges from the same political party is more likely to vote in
a stereotypically partisan direction, or (2) “ideological dampening,” when a
judge from one party sitting with two judges from a different party is less
likely to vote in an ideological direction.69
As some scholars have reported, this field of study has become “increasingly contentious” 70 as the presence, extent, nature, and operative
characteristics of panel effects, as well as study designs and explanatory
theories, are increasingly and sharply debated. Findings that an appellate
judge’s vote is influenced by the other judges serving on the same panel
have been variously attributed71 to the positive value of the information
exchanged during collegial deliberation,72 a pragmatic aversion to preparing
a dissent by the judge whose preferences leave him or her in the minority,73
the threat that a judge who is from a different party than the other two panel
members may “blow the whistle” if the majority were to depart from the
67. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997).
68. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155
(1998).
69. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? 8–11 (2006).
70. Derek J. Linkous & Emerson H. Tiller, Response, Panel Effects, Whistleblowing
Theory, and the Role of Legal Doctrine, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 83, 83 (2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2009/LinkousTiller.pdf.
71. For a summary of the competing theories put forward by scholars to explain panel
effects, see Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1319, 1329–38 (2009), and
Joshua B. Fischman, Understanding Voting Behavior in Circuit Court Panels, Nw. L.
Sch. Searle Center 2–3 (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/
papers/Fischman_voting_behavior.pdf.
72. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1639, 1641, 1661 (2003).
73. See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 32–34 (2008).
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constraints of doctrine to indulge political preferences,74 strategic accounts
responsive to the preferences of the Supreme Court or the full circuit,75
and group psychology that pressures the minority judge to conform.76
While most scholars have placed partisan configurations on three-judge
panels at the center of such studies, scholars have begun to explore other
characteristics, including gender77 and race.78 Moreover, Professor Joshua
Fischman recently reexamined data sets from several studies and found
that the variations in judge’s votes associated with appellate panels actually “result[] from colleagues’ votes rather than their characteristics”—that
is, a judge is moved toward the votes of other judges by the norm of consensus, irrespective of the presumed preferences of the other judges, whether
based on party, gender, race, or other characteristics.79
Because we have focused in this study on a more fully specified model
of variables that may influence decisions of religious liberty cases in the
lower federal courts (with the ideology variables being but one part of the
overall study), and because we include both appellate and trial judges (as
well as judge votes on en banc panels), we do not expect here to make a
major contribution to the literature on panel effects. Nonetheless, so that the
potential amplifying or dampening effects of party influences on judges
would not be neglected, we did include rough measures of panel characteristics in alternative regression runs in an attempt to tease out panel effects on
Establishment Clause decisions.
For every judge participating on a three-judge appellate panel, 80
we coded for the addition of one Republican-appointed judge, two
74. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 68, at 2159–61, 2171–72.
75. Kim, supra note 71, at 1328, 1368.
76. See Sunstein et al., supra note 69, at 67–69.
77. See, e.g., Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S.
Court of Appeals: Minority Representation under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 299, 324 (2004) (“[In employment discrimination cases] male judges vote more liberally
when one woman serves on a panel with them.”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges
Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L.J.
1759, 1778 (2005) (finding that a male judge was twice as likely to rule for the plaintiff in
sexual harassment or sex discrimination cases if a woman judge was on the panel).
78. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 4, 34–37 (2008) (finding a 20 percent higher probability that a white judge will vote
in favor of a voting rights claim when sitting on a panel with an African-American judge).
79. Fischman, supra note 71, at 3–4; see also Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of “Consensus Voting”, J.L. & Econ. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361348
(analyzing the desire for consensus among judges and the effect on appellate panels). But see
Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Indirect Influences of Gender on the U.S. Court of Appeals:
Evidence from Sexual Harassment Law, Colum. U., http://www.columbia.edu/~gjw10/
FarhangWawroIndirectEffectsMay2010.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) (finding significant
gender-based panel effects in sexual harassment cases).
80. In coding these variables, we included all three-judge appellate panels, including
those that preceded an en banc rehearing and those that were the subject of dissents from denial of rehearing en banc, but only the members of the original three-judge panel were coded
for investigation of panel effects.
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Republican-appointed judges, one Democratic-appointed judge, and two
Democratic-appointed judges.81 By excluding district court judges (other
than district court judges sitting by designation on a three-judge appellate
panel),82 dissents from denial of rehearing en banc, and judges who served
on an en banc panel but not the original three-judge panel, the number of
judicial participations in this part of the study dropped from 555 to 287.83 Of
the 101 three-judge panels examined in this part of the study, 78.2 percent
had mixed compositions, and 21.8 percent were made up of three judges
appointed by presidents of the same party.
Although the coefficients for our panel effects variables point in the
predicted direction—adding Democratic-appointed judges is positive for the
Establishment Clause outcome dependent variable, while adding Republican-appointed judges is negative—none of these variables achieved
statistical significance at the .05 level or even marginal significance at the .10
level.84 Thus, our results on this limited panel effects investigation preclude
81. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1493, 1530–32 (2008) (using variables for
one and two additional Democratic-appointed judges as control variables for the partisan
composition of a panel). We ran each of these four variables in separate regression runs because we found them to be overlapping and collinear. Panels on which the coded judge was
joined by two additional Republicans (or Democrats) obviously also included one additional
Republican (or Democrat). And if a panel included two additional Republicans, then it obviously could not include any additional Democrats (and vice versa).
82. In this study, we did not exclude district court judges sitting on a three-judge appellate panel by designation but reported the full population of judges who actually decided
appellate cases. (District court judges did not sit on en banc appellate panels.) District court
judges sitting by designation accounted for only 17 of the 422 overall appellate judicial votes
in Establishment Clause cases. District court judges served on 17 of the 101 three-judge panels, with 6 of those 17 being divided panels. Recent empirical work on district court judges
sitting by designation in a large sample of appellate cases found that, in 83% of cases, “district
court judges are no different than regular sitting court of appeals jurists when it comes to the
influence of their fellow panelists.” Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Wendy L. Martinek, The Small
Group Context: Designated District Court Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 177, 194–95 (2011). In the 17% of the cases in which there was found to be
a statistically significant difference, the influence of the ideology of other panel members on a
designated district court judge was more than three times greater than on court of appeals
judges, although the actual margin of difference was still substantively small; for example,
when the other two panel members were highly conservative, a district court judge sitting by
designation was predicted to be 4% more likely to cast a conservative vote, while a court of
appeals judge sitting on a panel with similarly coded conservative judges was only 1.3% more
likely to reach a conservative outcome. Id. at 195.
83. Although these observations came from 101 three-judge panels, the total number of
judges on these panels who were coded on the merits for Establishment Clause votes came to
287, because some judges on those panels concurred or dissented on separate grounds that did
not resolve the merits of the claim.
84. In sum, the probability that there is no variation between the predicted rates of a
positive judicial vote on an Establishment Clause claim with or without an additional Democratic- or Republican-appointed judge on a panel is greater than 5% or even 10%. To give the
reader a sense of the size effect of the correlation, despite the lack of statistical significance,
our best estimate is that the addition of a Democratic-appointed judge to a panel would have
increased the predicted probability that a judge would vote in favor of the Establishment
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any confident conclusion that judges shifted their votes toward the presumed
preferences of other colleagues on three-judge panels. In the particular context of Establishment Clause decisions, judges appear to have gone out the
same door through which they came in, regardless of partisan mix on panels.
3. Common Space Scores (Judge Ideology)
As an alternative measure of judicial ideology, and to further test the robustness of a political or ideological influence in Establishment Clause
decisions in the lower federal courts, we also coded each district and court
of appeals judge for Common Space Scores.
Professors Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal originally developed the
NOMINATE Common Space Score measure of ideological preferences for
members of Congress, placing all aspects of legislative voting into the same
ideological dimension along a liberal–conservative continuum. 85 Subsequently, Professors Micheal Giles, Virginia Hettinger, and Todd Peppers
adapted this measure for judges, by assigning the NOMINATE Common
Space Score for the home-state senator to a federal judge being appointed to
a vacancy in that state when the senator is of the same party as the president
(thus assuming that senatorial courtesy applies) and otherwise assigning to
the judge the score of the president.86 Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers explain
how the scores are calculated as follows:
Scores on this dimension are scaled from –1 for most liberal to +1 for most
conservative. Absent senatorial courtesy the measure of senatorial preferences is assigned a value of zero [and the President’s score is substituted].
If senatorial courtesy is operative and there are two senators of the President’s party in a state, senatorial preferences are measured as the mean of
the common space scores of the senators.87

Political scientists have come to regard Common Space Scores as “the
state-of-the-art measure for the preferences of US Court of Appeals judg-

Clause claim from 27.7% to 39.4%. However, as expected because the variable is not statistically significant, the 95% confidence intervals overlap considerably, with the upper end of the
interval for the scenario with no additional Democratic-appointed judge rising to 37.1% and
the lower end of the interval for the scenario with an additional Democratic-appointed judge
beginning at 28.7%. On 95% confidence intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying
text.
85. Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic
History of Roll Call Voting (1997).
86. Micheal Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A
Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 Pol. Res. Q. 623 (2001); see also Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 173–76 (describing and evaluating Common Space Scores as
measure of judicial ideology); Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 783–91
(describing and critiquing the Common Space Score measure).
87. Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 86, at 631.
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es.”88 The Common Space Score measure reflects the reality that different
presidents of the same political party have different political preferences, as
is also true of different home-state senators of the same party who play a
role in judicial appointments. Moreover, Common Space Scores, which lie
along a continuum, plainly are superior to the limited, two-sided Party of
Appointing President variable for examining the relative ideology of judges;
for example, one can apply the scores to identify the ideological mean on an
appellate panel or to measure the ideological distance between a panel and
the circuit as a whole or a superior court.89 While Common Space Scores
have been used successfully as a reliable and valid measure, some studies
that included ideology proxies as part of a more fully specified model of
other judge-specific variables have found Common Space Scores to be
largely interchangeable with the Party of Appointing President proxy that
continues to be the convention in the legal academy.90
Although the Common Space Score spectrum ranges from –1 (extremely liberal) to 1 (extremely conservative), real-world political actors,
especially those elected to the presidency and the United States Senate, are
unlikely to fall at the extremes. Likewise, given that judicial Common Space
Scores are derived from the legislative-based scores of appointing presidents
and home-state senators, the district and circuit judges included in our study
do not fall across the entire spectrum. The most liberal score in our set of
judges is –0.626; the most conservative is 0.656; and the mean is 0.067 (just
slightly right of center).
Figure 3 maps the judges in the Establishment Clause study by density
at each one-tenth incremental position on the Common Space Score continuum. Judges are distributed across the full range from –0.6 to 0.6. While
there are substantial bands of judges who fall near the 0 point (the middle or
moderate position), the largest clusters of judges fall around the –0.5 and 0.5
marks; that is, the solidly (but not extremely) liberal and conservative point
positions.

88. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 303, 306
(2007).
89. See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An
Empirical Study, 2012 Utah L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 23–24); Micheal W. Giles,
Thomas Walker & Christopher Zorn, Setting a Judicial Agenda: The Decision to Grant En
Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 68 J. Pol. 852, 854 (2006).
90. Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 204; Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra
note 8, at 788–89. But see Micheal Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Measuring
the Preferences of Federal Judges: Alternatives to Party of the Appointing President 10 (2002)
(working paper) (finding that the Common Space Score measure “clearly out-perform[s] simple reliance on the party of the appointing president”).
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Density/Frequency of Ideology Common Space Scores by
Judge (555 Judicial Observations); Liberal < 0; Conservative > 0
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One of the major drawbacks of the Common Space Score proxy for judicial ideology is that the results are difficult to interpret and the real-world
meaning of a particular point on the spectrum may not be intuitive for either
the empirical scholar or the nonexpert reader.91 At the risk of misleading the
reader into seeing our results as direct reports on the behavior of specific
judges, we try here to put a face on the Common Space Score metric by
gathering a few prominent federal appellate judges into broad score cohorts.
On the conservative (or positive sign) side of the Common Space Score
continuum, Judge (now Professor) Michael McConnell and Judge Alex
Kozinski received scores between 0.3 and 0.4; Judges Frank Easterbrook,
Edith Jones, and (now Justice) Samuel Alito received scores between 0.5
and 0.6; Judge Richard Posner was scored right at the middle point, with 0.
On the liberal (or negative sign) side, Judges Richard Arnold, José
Cabranes, and Guido Calabresi received scores between -0.2 and –0.3;
Judge (now Justice) Sonia Sotomayor was scored between –0.3 and –0.4;
and Judges Diane Wood and Stephen Reinhardt received scores between
–0.4 and –0.5.
However, the reader should understand that the findings in our study are
based on analyses of aggregate data and thus do not support a prediction (or
report a past record) of how any individual judge has or will decide cases.
91. Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 175 (observing that the results produced with
Common Space Scores “are less intuitive and more difficult to interpret”).
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Moreover, the graph presented below in Figure 4 is based on average predicted probabilities for each incremental step in the scores, while holding
other variables constant, and is not a report of frequencies of individual
judge voting.
As Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers reported when they initially adapted
the Common Space Score to judicial studies, the Common Space Score is
highly correlated with the Party-of-Appointing-President variable (at
.825).92 Thus, using the Common Space Scores as an alternative allows us to
solidify our findings and verify in more than one way that ideology is correlated with the dependent variable and that the magnitude of that effect is
substantial.
In these respects, our findings are confirmed. As with the Party-ofAppointing-President variable, the Common Space Score ideology proxy
was highly significant at the .001 level. Just as being appointed by a Republican president was negatively associated with a positive vote on an
Establishment Clause claim, being scored conservative on the Common
Space Score continuum was likewise negatively associated with a positive
vote. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect on the dependent variable was
quite substantial. Holding all other variables constant at their means, the
more liberal judges under the Common Space Score measure (at –0.6) were
predicted to uphold Establishment Clause claims at a 62.5 percent rate,
while the more conservative judges (at 0.6) were predicted to uphold such
claims at a 23.2 percent rate.
In Figure 4, we generate the average predicted probabilities of a positive
vote on an Establishment Clause claim for each Common Space Score in the
range from –0.6 to 0.6, at increments of 0.1, while holding the other independent variables constant. The solid darker line in the middle is the best
estimate of the average predicted probability for that increment in the
Common Space Score. The lighter broken lines, which appear above and
below, are the higher and lower parameters of the 95 percent confidence
intervals for the average predicted probability at each one-tenth increment of
the Common Space Score continuum.93

92.
93.

Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 90, at 5–6.
On 95 percent confidence intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
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Figure 4.
Predicted Probability of Positive Vote by Judge on Establishment
Clause Claim (1996–2005), by Common Space Score Increments;
Liberal < 0; Conservative > 0

4. Precedent, Case Type, and Other Variables
Precedent Variables: We included two mandatory precedent variables, as
measures of traditional legal influences on Establishment Clause decisions
in the lower federal courts: (1) Agostini v. Felton,94 in which the Supreme
Court overturned two prior precedents and approved government provision
of remedial education services on the premises of parochial schools; and
(2) Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 95 in which the Supreme Court upheld a
school voucher program that included private religious schools.
As reported in Table 1, the Agostini variable was significant in the model
including Party of Appointing President as the ideology variable (while the
Zelman variable was not significant in either model). Our study thereby confirms the continuing importance of legal factors in fully understanding
judicial decisionmaking. In Section II.B.3 of this Article, we further discuss
the Agostini decision, the magnitude of the effect of this precedent variable
as evidence of the importance of law in judicial decisionmaking, and examine whether the Supreme Court’s clarification of Establishment Clause
doctrine may constrain political judging in this area.

94.
95.

521 U.S. 203, 235–37 (1997).
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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Case-Type Variables: We included Case-Type control variables to ensure
that any relationship discovered between other independent variables and
the dependent variable was not an “artifact” of some correlation between
that variable and a general factual type of case.96 The six Case-Type dummy
variables were:97
(1) Private Education (31 or 5.6% of observations);
(2) Public Education—Elementary (77 or 13.9%);
(3) Public Education—Secondary/Higher (106 or 19.1%);
(4) Religious Meetings (in public facilities) (50 or 9%);
(5) Religious Symbols (on public property or for public entities)
(155 or 27.9%); and
(6) Other (136 or 24.5%).
If none of these Case-Type variables had proven to be significant, that
would have suggested an error in our selection of the appropriate control
variables. In fact, as shown in Table 1 above, four of the five Case-Type variables—Private Education, Public Education-Secondary/Higher, Religious
Meetings, and Religious Symbols included in the regression runs98—were
statistically significant in both the Party of Appointing President and Common Space Score models.
Because legal doctrine develops in response and by specific reference to
factual contexts, such that the application of a legal rule or standard turns to
a greater or lesser extent on the defined factual category into which a case
falls, the significance of these Case-Type variables may provide some evidence of the legal model at work. Nonetheless, we do not offer these
particular findings as substantial evidence in support of the legal model of
judging. Our Case-Type variables were defined with a greater breadth than
would lend themselves to direct integration into most doctrinal formulas. We
are reluctant to place much interpretive weight upon the inclusion of these
control variables in a statistical model.
96.

As Donald Songer and Susan Tabrizi have explained,

[In a study of evangelical Christian judges and rulings in death penalty, gender discrimination, and obscenity cases,] [t]he case facts employed in each model below are
primarily viewed as control variables to insure that any associations discovered between
religion and judicial decisions are not an artifact of some correlation between particular
types of cases and the concentration of particular religions in regions giving rise to those
types of cases.

Donald R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, Research Note, The Religious Right in Court: The
Decision Making of Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. Pol. 507, 517
(1999).
97. For a discussion of Case Type control variables and a further description of them as
used in our prior study of Establishment Clause decisions, see Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra
note 8, at 573–74.
98. The sixth Case Type dummy variable (“Other”) was omitted as the reference variable.
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Religious Demographic Variables: Finally, we note the interesting and
statistically significant association with the outcome variable of one of our
study’s community demographic variables—the percentage of Catholics in
the population of the metropolitan area in which the judge has his or her
chambers. The correlation points in a surprising direction that, upon further
reflection, we believe may indicate that this variable actually is an indirect
proxy for—and further confirmation of the salience of—partisan or ideological influences in this context.
In addition to identifying the judge’s individual religious affiliation, we also included three variables designed to measure the religious demographics of
the community in which the judge works (by the county in which the judge
has chambers): the percentage of Catholic adherents compared to the entire
population (Catholic Percentage); the percentage of Jewish adherents in the
population (Jewish Percentage); and the religious adherence rate overall that
serves as a proxy for the general religiosity of that community (Adherence
Rate). The source of the religious demographic data in our study is the 2000
survey conducted by the Glenmary Research Center, Religious Congregations & Membership: 2000, which is based on reports from 149 religious
bodies broken down by region and county.99 Given that the year 2000 falls
directly in the middle of the period for our study (1996–2005), the
Glenmary study offered the most contemporaneous and comprehensive
measure of religious demographics for our purposes. As we have written
previously, “Because judges as human actors and social beings live and
work in a particular social milieu, the religious context or atmosphere of that
community may influence a judge’s perception of legal claims that implicate
religion or that involve appeals to religious adherence.”100
As reported in Table 1 above, the Catholic Percentage variable was significantly and positively associated with the Establishment Clause claim
outcome dependent variable at the .01 level in the model that included Party
of Appointing President (but fell outside of significance at the .05 level in
the model using Common Space Scores, moving to marginal significance at
the .07 level). Interestingly, the association is not in the direction we hypothesized, which was that a higher Catholic demographic would move
community attitudes (and the judge situated in that community) to be more
favorable toward interactions between government and religious institutions
(especially in government-aid cases, many of which involve government aid
to students attending Catholic parochial schools). Accordingly, we expected
the Catholic Percentage variable, if significant, to be correlated with a rejection of Establishment Clause claims.
On further consideration, we realize that this may be an example of a
confounding unmeasured variable. A confounding variable is an omitted
variable that is correlated with the observed independent variable (here,
99. Dale E. Jones et al., Glenmary Research Center, Religious Congregations & Membership in the United States 2000 (2002).
100. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 8, at 585. For more on including religious characteristics of the community in empirical studies, including judicial decisionmaking, see id.
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Catholic Percentage) and has an effect on the dependent variable (here, the
outcome in Establishment Clause cases). As discussed subsequently in Section II.A.1 of this Article, Catholics in the United States have moved from
loyal support for the Democratic Party to political independence and even
marginal support for the Republican Party. However, the metropolitan
Northeast historically has been dominated by Catholicism101 (and northern
urban areas also tend to have higher rates of Catholic adherence), which are
precisely the areas in which the Democratic Party retains the strongest affiliation and electoral success. Moreover, as with most other religious
communities, there are ideological differences among Catholics, with
more liberal Catholics more likely to be situated in those Northeastern and
northern urban centers.102 Thus, our attempt to measure the influence of
Catholic demographics may indirectly have captured an unmeasured association with Democratic Party affiliation or support or general liberal
ideology in metropolitan communities. Given that the Democratic Party is
increasingly associated with a strict separationist position on Church and
State issues, we would predict that communities with higher Democratic
Party demographics would be correlated, if at all, with a more favorable
attitude toward Establishment Clause challenges.
If we are correct in this speculation, the significance of the Catholic Percentage variable in our study could be further confirmation of the political
divide on Church and State matters that has permeated the judiciary and
which is the central theme of this Article. In future stages of our ongoing
study of religious liberty decisions, we should include a party affiliation or
party vote variable for each county, perhaps along with regional or population density measures, so as to control for and independently examine the
separate influences of religious and political demographics.
II. Why Have Political Differences Among Federal Judges
Emerged So Powerfully in Establishment Clause Cases?
With the first clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution directing that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”103 the role of religion in
public life has been a subject of priority and controversy since the founding
of the Republic. However, resolution by the courts of disputes at the intersection of religious activity and state action is of relatively recent vintage.
Only a little more than sixty years ago, and more than 150 years after the
Constitution was ratified, the Supreme Court first applied the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to action by state and local governments in

101. Christopher G. Ellison, Jeffrey A. Burr & Patricia L. McCall., Religious Homogeneity and Metropolitan Suicide Rates, 76 Soc. Forces 273, 277–78 (1997).
102. See Earl Black & Merle Black, Divided America 105–07 (2007) (describing
the traditional concentrations of liberal Catholics, among other Democratic constituencies, in
New York City, Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh).
103. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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Everson v. Board of Education.104 And it has been less than half a century
since the Supreme Court applied the Establishment Clause to remove officially sponsored prayer from public schools in Engel v. Vitale.105
From the beginning of the modern Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, a tension has persisted between acknowledging the
long and vital role that religion has played in the public and private lives of
Americans and resisting an integration of religion with the mechanisms of
government. Professor Thomas Berg describes the Supreme Court’s pioneering Everson decision as having “a split personality.”106 On the one hand,
the Court drew a clear line against a “tax in any amount, large or small, [that
would be] levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion.”107 In sweeping language, the Court said, “Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.”108 On the other hand, the
Everson majority did approve reimbursing parochial school children for bus
transportation from public funds. By “extending . . . general state law benefits to all its citizens,” the state would not “hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion.”109 In offering to citizens the benefits of public welfare legislation, the state “cannot exclude individual Catholics,
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack
of it.”110
The same dichotomy of jurisprudential perspectives is manifest today.
Nearly sixty years after Everson, a plurality of the Supreme Court described
the Court’s long and conflicting series of decisions as “Januslike, point[ing]
in two directions in applying the Establishment Clause. One face looks toward the strong role played by religion and religious traditions throughout
our Nation’s history. . . . The other face looks toward the principle that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious
freedom.”111
Professor Scott Idleman summarizes the conflicting perspectives in this
way:

104. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
105. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For the background and impact of Engel and the school prayer decisions, see generally Thomas C. Berg, The Story of the School Prayer Decisions: Civil
Religion Under Assault, in First Amendment Stories 193 (Richard Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
106. Thomas C. Berg, Lemon v. Kurtzman: The Parochial School Crisis and the Establishment Clause, in Law and Religion: Cases in Context 153, 155 (Leslie Griffin ed.,
2010).
107. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005).
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[A key] subsurface variable in the jurisprudence of the religion clauses is
the perceived relationship between religion and society . . . . Specifically,
does one tend to view the presence or influence of religion, or of a particular religion, as either necessary, irrelevant, or deleterious to the proper
functioning and prosperity of society and politics? Alternatively stated,
does one believe—intuitively, or perhaps empirically—that religion is
overall a positive, neutral, or negative factor in American life?112

A. The Partisan Political Division in the United States
on Matters of Church and State
1. The Emergence of the “God Gap” Between Republicans
and Democrats in National Politics
As the Supreme Court began taking an ever more prominent role in
drawing a constitutional line between what it regarded as valid public interaction with religion or religious institutions and invalid government
entanglement with religion, a strong reaction in the political realm was inevitable. In 1962, when the Court invalidated prayer in public schools, Senator
Sam Ervin of North Carolina retorted, “I should like to ask whether we
would be far wrong in saying that in this decision the Supreme Court has
held that God is unconstitutional and for that reason the public school must
be segregated against Him?”113 Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s,
highways throughout the United States, especially in the South, were lined
with “Impeach Earl Warren” billboards, a protest movement against liberal
judicial rulings that gained momentum from the political backlash to the
Court’s school prayer decision.114
As often is the case with sharply contested policy questions in the United States, the political reaction to the presence of religious influences in
public life eventually divided along partisan lines—although the partisan
divide was slow to emerge. As Professors Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio
describe it, the general consensus in American politics on traditional JudeoChristian values “was shattered in 1972 when the Democratic Party was
captured by a faction whose cultural reform agenda was perceived by many
(both inside and outside the convention) as antagonistic to traditional religious
values.”115 Over the next three decades, those who seldom or never attended
religious services gravitated toward the Democratic Party, while Americans
112. Scott C. Idleman, The Underlying Causes of Divergent First Amendment Interpretations, 27 Miss. C. L. Rev. 67, 83 (2007).
113. Susan Dudley Gold, ENGEL V. VITALE: Prayer in the Schools 103 (2006).
114. Berg, supra note 105, at 211; see also The Times Were a Changin’: The Sixties
Reader 221 (Irwin Unger & Debi Unger eds., 1998) (“One of the right-wing icons of the
decade was the ubiquitous ‘Impeach Earl Warren’ billboard, sponsored by the far right John
Birch Society and displayed across Dixie and in parts of the North.”).
115. Louis Bolce & Gerald De Maio, Secularists, Antifundamentalists, and the New
Religious Divide in the American Electorate, in From Pews to Polling Places: Faith and
Politics in the American Religious Mosaic 251, 256 (J. Matthew Wilson ed., 2007).
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with high levels of religious participation became an increasingly central
part of the Republican Party constituency.
By 2007, Bolce and De Maio could report that, over the four preceding
presidential elections, “the religious gap separating secularists and traditionalists was more important than other social and demographic cleavages in
the electorate: It was much larger than the gender gap and more significant
than any combination of income, education, marital status, age, and regional
groupings.”116
During most of the twentieth century, evangelical Protestants as a group
voted Democratic, occasionally crossing party lines to support a Republican
presidential candidate, such as when a Catholic was nominated by the Democratic Party in 1960 and when a cultural liberal was the Democratic
nominee in 1972.117 Beginning in the 1980s, however, committed evangelical Christians have become ever more loyal to the Republican Party.118 In
1944, white evangelical Protestants gave Democratic President Franklin
Roosevelt a solid majority with over 55 percent of their votes; by 2004,
white evangelical Protestants gave Republican President George W. Bush
more than three-quarters of their votes.119
Catholics were a stalwart Democratic constituency for more than
three-quarters of the last century. From a high point of 63 percent white
Catholic affiliation with the Democratic Party in 1960 (when John F.
Kennedy became the first and thus far only Catholic to win the White
House), Catholic identification with the Democratic Party remained at majority or near-majority status until after 1976.120 At the end of a period of
general decline, white Catholic support for the Democratic label fell to 30
percent in 2004 (even as another Catholic, John Kerry, was nominated by
that party for the presidency).121
Looking beyond voting behavior, Professors Clem Brooks and Jeff
Manza have found that, in recent decades, both evangelical Protestants and
Catholics have shifted their partisan affiliation away from the Democratic
Party and, more or less, toward the Republican Party: “Whereas evangelicals
have deepened their relatively Republican pattern of identification, Catholics
have moved from strong relative identification with the Democratic Party to
a more independent orientation.”122
116. Id. at 265.
117. Geoffrey Layman, The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in
American Party Politics 43, 183–85, 192 (2001).
118. Id. at 186–201.
119. John C. Green, The Faith Factor 39 (2007).
120. Stephen T. Mockabee, The Political Behavior of American Catholics: Change and
Continuity, in From Pews to Polling Places: Faith and Politics in the American Religious Mosaic, supra note 115, at 81, 83–85.
121. Id. at 84 tbl.4.1, 85. On the contrast between Catholic support for Kennedy in 1960
and for Kerry in 2004, see David E. Campbell, A House Divided? What Social Science Has to
Say about the Culture War, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 59, 65–67 (2006).
122. Clem Brooks & Jeff Manza, A Great Divide? Religion and Political Change in U.S.
National Elections, 1972–2000, 45 Soc. Q. 421, 442 (2004); see also Harold W. Stanley &
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The movement toward the Republican Party has been especially pronounced for the most religiously observant Americans. “All else equal,”
Professor William Galston writes, “the more often individuals attend church,
the more likely they are to regard themselves as conservatives and vote Republican.”123 In the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, nearly two-thirds
(63 and 64 percent respectively) of those who attended religious services
more than once a week, along with large majorities (57 and 58 percent) of
those who attended once a week, voted for the Republican candidate.124
In a recent and sophisticated survey of “religious intensity” and social
and political views, the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life found the
following trend: “Across a variety of religious traditions, those who say that
religion is very important in their lives, express a more certain belief in God,
or pray or attend worship services more frequently tend to be much more
conservative in their political outlook and more Republican in their party
affiliation.”125
During this same period, the Democratic Party has become the political
home for secularists, who have become a key constituency in the party.126
Although the point of departure may have been the 1972 Democratic Party
Convention that nominated George McGovern, the secularist tinge among
Democratic Party activists has only deepened in the ensuing decades. By
1992, fewer than a third of first-time delegates to the Democratic Convention attended church regularly, fewer than a quarter of first-time delegates
and approximately one-quarter of all Democratic delegates found religion to
be highly salient in their lives, and more than 60% of all Democratic delegates qualified as secularist in outlook.127 In the 2000 presidential election,
those who reported either no religious affiliation or that they never attend
religious services voted by a nearly two-thirds margin (61% of each) for the
Democratic candidate.128 In 2004, those margins increased to 67% and 62%
respectively.129

Richard G. Niemi, Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support, 1952–2004, 36 Presidential Stud. Q. 172, 180 (2006) (“Declining Democratic partisanship among Catholics and
regular church-goers was also matched by increasing identification with Republicans.”).
123. William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L.
Rev. 307, 308 (2008); see also Andrew Kohut et al., The Diminishing Divide: Religion’s Changing Role in American Politics 4 (2000).
124. 2000 National Election Exit Poll Results, ABCNews.com, http://abcnews.go.com/
sections/politics/2000vote/general/exitpoll_hub.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012); 2004 U.S.
President National Exit Poll Results, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/
pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
125. Pew Forum on Religion & Pub. Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey 19
(2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2-religious-landscape-studyfull.pdf.
126. See Kohut et al., supra note 123, at 3.
127. Layman, supra note 117, at 107, 108 fig.3.2, 109, 124.
128. 2000 National Election Exit Poll Results, supra note 124.
129. Compare id. (2000 margins), with 2004 U.S. President National Exit Poll Results,
supra note 124 (2004 margins).
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To be sure, the Democratic Party and progressive political campaigns
continue to draw the support of many persons of religious faith.130 As an
important and longstanding example, Jews in the United States have long
been closely identified with both the Democratic Party and a separationist
approach to Church and State issues. Professor Stephen Feldman has described American Jews as a “prototypical religious outgroup” that as a
matter of principle has “strongly advocate[d] for the strict separation of
church and state.”131 However, even among Jews, a “Devotional Divide”132
has emerged in political affiliation, with a growing percentage of Jews who
attend synagogue weekly voting Republican, along with an overwhelming
proportion of the small but growing Orthodox Jewish community.133 Still,
the political left has not yet resolved into an exclusively secularist political
movement in the United States. 134 Nonetheless, those with a secularist
worldview, or at least those with “weak[er] religious attachments,”135 increasingly have been drawn toward that side of the political spectrum. As
Professor Geoffrey Layman concludes, the “core support” for the Democratic Party consists of “secularists, Jews, and the less committed members of
the major religious traditions.”136

130. See generally Steven H. Shiffrin, The Religious Left and Church-State
Relations 3–4 (2009) (advocating greater engagement in American politics by religious
progressives on expressly religious premises, while acknowledging that “the secular Left is
believed to dominate the Democratic Party”). In a survey of political attitudes in 2010, the
Pew Research Center identified two Democratic-leaning typologies of voters who remain
highly religious: “New Coalition Democrats,” a majority of whom are minorities and who are
both highly religious and financially stressed, and “Hard-Pressed Democrats,” who are bluecollar, struggling financially, and very religious. Pew Research Center for the People &
the Press, Beyond Red vs. Blue: Political Typology 15–16 (2011), available at
http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Beyond-Red-vs-Blue-The-Political-Typology.pdf.
131. Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History,
the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 222, 238, 246 (2003); see also Michael J.
Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 58
(1996) (“As a small minority within an overwhelmingly Christian nation, Jews generally favored a policy of stringent separationism, rather than one of nondiscrimination against
particular sects.”).
132. See David E. Campbell, supra note 121, at 64 (describing the difference in religious
activity associated with political affiliation as the “Devotional Divide”).
133. See Jay Lefkowitz, The Election and the Jewish Vote, Comment., Feb. 2005, at 61,
64 (reporting that 40% of Jews who attend synagogue weekly and 69% of Orthodox Jews
voted for Republican George W. Bush in 2004, compared to only 18% of Jews who rarely or
never attend synagogue).
134. See Galston, supra note 123, at 319; Kohut et al., supra note 123, at 74.
135. See Michael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No Religious
Preference: Politics and Generations, 67 Am. Soc. Rev. 165, 179 (2002) (suggesting in a
study of religious preferences, not including a focus on political party affiliation, that the “religiously tinged political atmosphere not only brought some religious people out of apathy
into politics but also pushed some moderate and liberal Americans with weak religious attachments away from religion”).
136. Layman, supra note 117, at 107.
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In 2008, President Obama’s campaign made concerted overtures to religious voters,137 and much was made of the fact that a majority of Catholic
voters overall (without controlling for religious commitment) supported the
Democratic candidate for the first time in several presidential election cycles.138 However, the 2008 exit polls suggest that the so-called “God Gap”
between the parties remained in force, if slightly diminished. A majority
(55%) of those who attended religious services weekly or more voted for the
Republican, while three-quarters (75%) of those with no religion and more
than two-thirds of those who never attended religious services voted for the
Democrat.139 And the “God Gap” certainly was evident in the 2010 midterm
elections for the House of Representatives, with Republicans winning a solid majority from Catholics, Protestants, and weekly church attendees (54%,
59%, and 58% respectively), while more than two-thirds (68%) of those
with no religious affiliation voted Democratic.140
To further illustrate the difference, as shown in Figure 5 prepared by
Bolce and De Maio, while the religious divide in partisan identification was
only 15 percentage points in 1988, the gap in partisan affiliation between
secularists (most of whom identify with the Democratic Party) and traditional religionists (most of whom identify with the Republican Party) grew
to 66 percentage points in 2004.141

137. See Michael Gerson, Op-Ed., Obama's New Culture War over Government’s Role,
Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 2010, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/04/AR2010100404560.html (“As a candidate, it was a measure of
Barack Obama’s political innovation and ambition that he set out to win religious voters, including evangelical Christians. . . . During the campaign, Obama’s brand of progressivism was
refreshingly free of secularism.”).
138. See 2008 Presidential Election National Exit Poll, CNNPolitics.com, http://www.
cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p2 (last visited Jan 20, 2012).
139. Id.; see also John C. Green & Scott Clement, Much Hope, Modest Change for
Democrats: Religion in the 2008 Presidential Election, Pew Forum on Religion & Pub.
Life (Aug. 11, 2010), http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Much-Hope-Modest-Changefor-Democrats-Religion-in-the-2008-Presidential-Election.aspx (finding that “the contours of
religion and politics were the same in 2008 as in 2004,” and that “the large gaps in the electorate
that had developed along religious lines in earlier elections persisted in 2008”).
140. 2010 U.S. House of Representatives National Exit Poll, CNNPolitics.com,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2010/results/polls/#USH00p1 (last visited Jan. 20, 2012);
see also Daniel Burke, Have Democrats Lost Faith in Faith-Based Outreach?, Religion
News Stories (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.religionnews.com/index.php?/rnstext/have_
democrats_lost_faith_in_faith_based_outreach (reporting that the Democratic Party’s “hardwon gains among religious voters are largely gone”).
141. Bolce & De Maio, supra note 115, at 264, 265 & fig.10.1.
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Figure 5.
142
The Religious Divide in Party Identification (1988–2004)

As Professors John Green and Laura Olson put it, “[T]he division between weekly attending White born-again Protestants and religiously
unaffiliated voters was nearly 56 percentage points in 2004, rivaling the size
of the electoral gap between Whites and Blacks.”143
With particular pertinence to our study on Establishment Clause cases,
the national platforms of the two parties confirm the sharp partisan dichotomy on the propriety of a vibrant religious presence in public life. 144
142. This chart is reprinted by permission from Bolce & De Maio, supra note 115, at
265. Copyright 2007 by Georgetown University Press. Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio,
“Secularists, Antifundamentalists, and the New Religious Divide in the American Electorate.”
In From Pews to Polling Places: Faith and Politics in the American Religious Mosaic, J. Matthew Wilson, Editor, p. 265. Reprinted with permission. www.press.georgetown.edu.
143. Laura R. Olson & John C. Green, “Gapology” and the 2004 Presidential Vote, in
Beyond Red State, Blue State: Electoral Gaps in the Twenty-First Century American Electorate 4 (Laura R. Olson & John C. Green, eds., 2008).
144. Some scholars fairly question the broader proposition that Americans are sharply
and contentiously divided, arguing instead that “there is actually widespread agreement, or at
least a fairly comfortable majority view, about religion’s place in politics.” Richard W. Garnett, “Modest Expectations”?: Civic Unity, Religious Pluralism, and Conscience, 23 Const.
Comment. 241, 257 (2006) (reviewing Noah Feldman, Divided by God (2005) and Kevin
Seamus Hasson, The Right to Be Wrong (2005)). Professor Richard Garnett suggests,
[M]ost people in America probably think . . . that the institutions of religion and government should be separate, but also that religious faith remains an important part of both
individual and social life, one that—consistent with the reality of pluralism and a commitment to the rights of minorities—does and should play a role in shaping our culture
and institutions.

Id. Indeed, most Americans may fall into a critical mass of general consensus; although
rather than bridging the gap between religionists and seculars, the center of gravity of the
American population as a whole may be located closer to the pro-religion side of the spectrum. See Louis Bolce & Gerald De Maio, The Divisiveness Rationale and Negative Reference
Group Associations in Church-State Controversies, in Religion, Politics, and American
identity: New Directions, New Controversies 109 (David Gutterman & Andrew Mur-
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Although religious references appear in the platforms of both parties, words
such as “God” and “prayer” appear regularly in Republican Party platforms,145
while “religion” or “religious” are most likely to appear in Democratic Party
platforms as planks calling for religious freedom around the world or opposing discrimination on multiple bases of which religion is but one.146 Since
1972, every Republican Party platform has called for the return of prayer to
schools and Republican platforms frequently have approved the public display of the Ten Commandments, 147 while the terms “prayer” and “Ten
Commandments” have never appeared in Democratic Party platforms during
this period.148 With some frequency, the Republican Party platform has inveighed against “judicial rulings which attempt to drive faith out of the
public arena,”149 while the Democratic Party on at least one occasion has
phy, eds., 2006) (“One of the reasons most Americans do not oppose organized religious
groups’ participating in the political process is that most do not think that religion’s influence
on political life is particularly harmful.”). In any event, the political science and sociology
literature surveyed above confirms that most political activists in the two major parties, who
are also those involved in making political appointments and litigating disputes, stand at
greater distances from one another on questions of Church and State than do most Americans.
145. See, e.g., 2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More
Hopeful America 1 (2004), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/
25850.pdf; 2008 Republican Platform i, ii, 45, 54 (2008), available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/78545.pdf; Republican Party Platform of 1996,
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848.
146. See, e.g., Democratic Party Platform of 1996, available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29611; Democratic Party Platform of 2000,
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29612; Report of the Platform Committee: Renewing America’s Promise 40, 52 (2008), available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/78283.pdf. But see Strong at Home, Respected in
the World: The 2004 Democratic National Platform for America 2, 19, available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/29613.pdf (twice referring to “one nation under
God”).
147. 2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful
America, supra note 145, at 77, 82 (school prayer and Ten Commandments); 2008 Republican Platform, supra note 145, at 44–45, 53 (school prayer and display of Ten
Commandments); Republican Party Platform of 1972, available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25842 (school prayer); Republican Party
Platform of 1976, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25843
(school prayer); Republican Party Platform of 1980, available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844 (school prayer); Republican Party
Platform of 1984, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
25845 (school prayer); Republican Party Platform of 1988, available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25846 (school prayer); Republican Party
Platform of 1992, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
25847 (school prayer); Republican Party Platform of 1996, supra note 145 (school prayer); Republican Party Platform of 2000, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=25849 (school prayer and Ten Commandments).
148. Cf. Democratic Party Platform of 1996, supra note 146 (The Platform “applaud[s] the President’s work to ensure that children are not denied private religious
expression in school,” without mentioning prayer).
149. 2008 Republican Platform, supra note 145, at 53; see also 2004 Republican
Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful America, supra note 145, at 77
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expressed its approval of “church/state separation and of the Supreme Court
decisions forbidding violations of those principles.”150 Thus, on questions of
law and religion, the two political parties, in their official pronouncements,
tend to fall into the two camps labeled by Professor Noah Feldman as “values evangelicals” and “legal secularists.”151
2. The Percolation of the Partisan Divide on Church
and State into Judicial Decisions
The question remains: has “our torpidly over-stimulated political culture,” 152 particularly on questions of law and religion, percolated into
judicial deliberations? As the results of our empirical study suggest,153 the
divide appears to be deep and wide between federal court judges appointed
by presidents of different parties in Establishment Clause cases decided between 1996 and 2005.
Our ideology variables—Party of Appointing President and Common
Space Scores (applied alternatively in separate regression models)—were
highly significant at the p < .001 level. And the magnitude of the effect was
substantial as well. Judges appointed by Democratic presidents were predicted to uphold Establishment Clause claims at a 57.3 percent rate, while
judges appointed by Republican presidents were predicted to rule in favor of
such claims at only a 25.4 percent rate. Thus, an Establishment Clause
claimant was more than twice as likely to prevail before a Democraticappointed as compared to a Republican-appointed judge.
This partisan gulf of 32 percentage points in Establishment Clause case
outcomes is about three times higher than the typical 10 percent (or less)
margin in outcomes reached by Republican-appointed compared to Democratic-appointed judges found in empirical studies of the federal courts that
include a variety of case types, even when those cases are likely to have an
ideological flavor and only published opinions are examined.154 As Cass

(“[W]e condemn judicial activists and their unwarranted and unconstitutional restrictions on
the free exercise of religion in the public square.”).
150. Text of 1984 Democratic Party Platform, 40 Cong. Q. Almanac 73B–106B
(1984), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal84-856-25733-1150986.
151. Feldman, supra note 21, at 7–8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Marc O. DeGirolami, The Handmaid of Politics, 26 J.L. & Religion 641, 645
(2011) (reviewing Steven H. Shriffin, The Religious Left and Church-and-State
Relations (2009)).
153. See supra Part I.B.1.
154. See, e.g., Rowland & Carp, supra note 63, at 34 (finding a difference of 10% to
13% between Democratic-appointed and Republican-appointed judges for all types of cases);
Sunstein et al., supra note 69, at 8–13 (finding that Democratic-appointed federal appellate
judges cast “stereotypically liberal” votes about 12% more of the time than Republicanappointed judges, on “a number of controversial issues that seem especially likely to reveal
divisions”); Ronald Stidham, Robert A. Carp & Donald R. Songer, The Voting Behavior of
President Clinton’s Judicial Appointees, 80 Judicature 16, 19–20 (1996) (concluding that
Clinton’s appointees have demonstrated moderate decisional tendencies and finding small
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Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa Michelle Ellman, and Andres Sawicki remarked on publication of their prominently reported study on ideological
influences on federal appellate judges, even “where party differences are
statistically significant, they are usually not huge.”155 Based on our findings
in the context of Establishment Clause cases, however, describing the party
differences as “huge” is certainly fair commentary.
In our previous writings, we repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with
“the concept of ideology as presently applied in empirical work regarding
the courts.”156 We have critiqued the common employment of measures of
“ideology” based on political party associations or the mainstream labeling
of liberal and conservative, questioned the use of ideology proxies that project on judges a mathematical construct derived from the preferences of
outside political actors, challenged the one-dimensional plotting of ideology
along the continuum of left to right in coding of case outcomes and judge
attitudes, and generally bemoaned the imposition of a political dichotomy
on to the courts in empirical models.157 In general, we have protested that
“[t]he empirical evidence cannot justify elevating the assumed ideological
or partisan affiliations of judges above such traditional measures of judicial
temperament as legal experience, quality of legal reasoning, respect for other actors in the legal process, and integrity.”158 And we have hardly been
alone in our critiques.159
But on this occasion, the potency of the political correlation cannot be
gainsaid. And, while we agree that Party of Appointing President is “a crude
proxy for judicial ideology,”160 that partisan measure appears to be quite
valid in the study of Establishment Clause decisions in the lower federal
courts, indeed more of a surrogate than a mere proxy.
By accepting the explanatory power of a partisan variable for judicial
decisionmaking in this particular context, we do not mean to suggest that
differences in “liberal” voting rates, generally under 10% across categories of cases, for both
district and court of appeals judges).
155 Sunstein et al., supra note 69, at 12.
156. Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal
Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 892 (2008) (reviewing Frank
B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2007)).
157. See Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 784–85, 793; Sisk, supra
note 156, at 892–93.
158. Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 794.
159. See e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 Duke L.J.
1895, 1918–22 (2009) (addressing the failure of empirical studies to “[m]eaningfully [d]efine
and [m]easure ‘[i]deology’ ”); Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 137–213 (addressing the
theoretical and methodological difficulties in defining, measuring, and analyzing ideology as
an influence on judges, concluding that an ideology measure based on the actual behavior of
judges in deciding cases offers advantages in several contexts of empirical study); Yung, supra
note 46, at 1135–36 (critiquing the Party of Appointing President and Common Space Score
ideology proxies).
160. Michael A. Livermore, Response, Realist Lawyers and Realistic Legalists: A Brief
Rebuttal to Judge Posner, 59 Duke L.J. 1187, 1192 (2010).
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federal judges in our study ruled as they did in order to toe the party line,
align their actions with the party’s national platform, or ingratiate themselves with fellow partisans. 161 Republican- and Democratic-appointed
judges presumably were not drawn toward one or the other outcome in Establishment Clause cases simply because that was the Republican or
Democratic preference. As Joshua Fischman and David Law explain,
“[P]roxy variables such as party of appointment should not be misinterpreted as causal variables.”162
Rather, persons with underlying attitudes and political perspectives that
were likely to move them toward the religious accommodation side of the
Establishment Clause divergence were also more likely to be appointed to
the federal bench by a Republican administration. Judges who by prior
disposition leaned toward the separationist side were more likely to be in a
position to be regarded for a judicial appointment by a Democratic administration. When the major political parties are so sharply divided and visibly
associated with opposing viewpoints on a question as prominent as the legitimate relationship between religion and the government (or public policy),
and, crucially, when the absence of constraining legal doctrine leaves judges
without clear guideposts in resolving Establishment Clause disputes, a
judge’s preexisting party-correlated attitude is more likely to surface.
Objectors understandably may interject that they personally know
Democratic-appointed federal judges who are faithful religious observers
and who embrace a robust role for religion in public life, or they may point
to Republican-appointed judges who are thoroughly secular in outlook.
Professor Raymond Wolfinger’s aphorism that “the plural of anecdote is
data” 163 may be correct in a descriptive sense. Nonetheless, the more
reliable, cumulative information generated by larger data sets drawn from a
wide population regularly reminds the empirical researcher that certain
anecdotal experiences may not be representative of the whole.164
Moreover, we acknowledge (and are gratified) that party or ideology are
not perfect predictors. Even in this study, judges did not fall strictly into
political patterns, and legal factors in the form of precedent continued to be
salient. Our study cannot legitimately be adduced as evidence that any individual judge is influenced by ideology or preexisting party-based attitudes.
Our study should not be used to predict whether a specific judge or panel
will vote a certain way in a particular Establishment Clause case. Nonethe161. Judge Patricia Wald similarly rejects the assumption, apparently indulged by some
empirical scholars, “that judges intentionally act in alignment with the party from which they
sprung.” Patricia M. Wald, Colloquy, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 235,
240 (1999).
162. Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 170.
163. Fred Shapiro, Quotes Uncovered: What’s the Plural of Anecdote?, Freakonomics
(Apr. 29, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2010/04/29/quotes-uncoveredwhats-the-plural-of-anecdote (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. See Agresti & Finlay, supra note 52, at 359 (“Sometimes you hear people give
anecdotal evidence to attempt to disprove causal relationships . . . . An association does not
need to be perfect, however, to be causal.”).
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less, the aggregate data subjected to multivariate regression analysis confirms the powerful impact of party and ideology on federal judges as a group
(or two groups—that is, Republican appointees and Democratic appointees)
in this field of adjudication.
Two other pieces of evidence from our study hint at the emergence of a
“God Gap” inside the federal judiciary, which parallels the division already
prevailing in national party politics:
First, of the 555 judicial participations included in our study, 15
participations by Republican-appointed judges and 40 participations by
Democratic-appointed judges were by those with no religious affiliation. The
ratio of observations with judges having no religious affiliation was nearly
four times higher for Democratic appointees (16.6 percent) than Republican
appointees (4.8 percent).
Federal judges have been asked repeatedly during the appointment process and by judicial biographers and researchers for information about their
beliefs and affiliations. During the confirmation process, judicial nominees
are asked to disclose membership in organizations, including churches, synagogues, and other faith-based groups. Along with other researchers, we
have reviewed biographical information and confirmation records for indications of religious affiliation, including memberships, speeches, and writings.
Thus, a judge coded as having no religious affiliation is not simply someone
who is private about personal beliefs but rather someone who apparently has
not belonged to or been active with any religious organization. Although
some of these unaffiliated judges may have personal religious or spiritual
beliefs, the apparent absence of any involvement with an organized community of faith may be consistent with a separationist perspective on Church
and State matters—in other words, regarding religious beliefs as strictly
private and personal and not appropriately adduced in the public dimension
of human life.165
We hasten to caution that this limited evidence by itself does not bear
great weight. More than 80 percent of Democratic-appointed judges in the
observations in our study reported a religious affiliation, so labeling this
category of jurists collectively as secularist would be wildly inaccurate and,
for many, insulting. Moreover, our independent variable for nonreligiously
affiliated judges was not statistically significant in our regression. We cannot
report that a greater share of religiously unaffiliated judges among Democratic appointees plays a significant role in the partisan disparity of
outcomes in Establishment Clause cases. On the other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility that, if we could look beyond denominational
identification to worship frequency or other religious behaviors,166 judges

165. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 8, at 578.
166. See John C. Blakeman & Christopher P. Bank, Presentation at Western Political
Science Association Annual Meeting, The Religiosity of Federal District Judges: Preliminary
Results from a Pilot Study of the Sixth Federal Circuit 26 (2009), available at http://www.
allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/7/4/3/p317437_index.html (describing preliminary study of religious beliefs and behaviors of federal judges and hypothesizing
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might display some of the same differences in devotional intensity that are
correlated with different political outlooks among the population generally.
Second, examining the raw frequencies of outcomes in Establishment
Clause cases when separated by presidential cohort, we find indirect evidence of a changing trend over time in the attitudes on Church and State
issues by appointees of different presidents.167 As shown in Figure 6, judges
appointed by President Johnson rejected Establishment Clause claims at a
fairly high rate, not much different than that of judges appointed by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan. Judges appointed by Presidents Carter and
Clinton upheld more than a majority of such claims, with Clinton judges
voting in favor of such claims at a rate nearly 20 percentage points higher
than Johnson judges. Judges appointed by Republican presidents have consistently turned away the substantial majority of Establishment Clause
claims, with the rejection rate spiking up under judges appointed by President George W. Bush.
Caution should be exercised in reviewing these comparative rates because during the 1996–2005 period of our study, the number of judicial
participations by judges appointed by Presidents Johnson (13) and Nixon
and Ford (31) and even Carter (70) is, not surprisingly, smaller than the
number by judges appointed by Presidents Reagan (153), George H.W.
Bush (97), and Clinton (158). Given that this study ended at the midpoint of
the George W. Bush Administration, the number of judicial participations
included from that cohort (33) is also small. In addition, the rates reported
here are raw frequencies from our data, rather than predicted rates after controlling for the independent effect of presidential cohorts through
multivariate regression.

that “the congregational context of a district judge’s religious life [may] correlate[] with his or
her views on the religious liberty clauses in the First Amendment”).
167. In our prior study of religious liberty decisions in the lower federal courts for the
period 1986–1995, we found that judges appointed by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson were significantly more likely to be associated with a Pro-Secular Model constructed
from both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause decisions. Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 768–69. When we published that earlier study, we speculated that judges
appointed during this era spent their formative years in the practice of law and on the federal
bench (from the 1940s to the early 1970s) at the highwater mark of the Supreme Court’s separationist approach to Establishment Clause cases. That Pro-Secular Model is not directly
parallel, although it overlaps, with the Establishment Clause stage of the present study, because the Pro-Secular Model in that prior study was defined not only by favorable responses to
Establishment Clause claims but also by negative responses to Free Exercise claims (and the
latter constituted a much larger proportion of the decisions in the model). In any event, notably, the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson judges had been appointed by presidents of both
parties, which is consistent with our current hypothesis that the partisan divide on Church and
State issues did not emerge until the period in which judges were being appointed by Presidents Carter and Reagan and thereafter.
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Figure 6.
Frequency of Positive Vote on Establishment Clause Claim by
Presidential Cohort of Judges (1996–2005)

In any event, we present the narrative of the partisan division between
highly committed religious believers and more secular-leaning citizens in
American politics not because it may be replicated in the personal religious
behavior or religion-based perspectives of individual federal judges (although, as noted, we do find preliminary evidence to that effect). Rather, and
more importantly, because the division on the proper role of religion in public life has sharpened along partisan lines over the past three decades, these
attitudes are likely to filter into appointment of judges, which always has
been and is increasingly part of the partisan political process. As Galston
notes about political division generally, “A feedback loop [may emerge]
that mutually reinforces polarized comportment up and down the political
food-chain . . . .”168 Thus, as party leaders, grassroots party activists, and
party-affiliated politicians mutually reinforce the party’s positions on issues
of Church and State, these positions inevitably play a role in identifying
nominees to the federal courts.
As a result, a more welcoming approach to the influences of faith on
public policy is likely to be found in Republican Party officeholders and
among Republican presidential appointees, while a more secular worldview
168. Galston, supra note 123, at 317; see also Brooks & Manza, supra note 122, at 434
(finding that, for evangelicals, higher levels of religious participations were correlated with
stronger support for Republican candidates).
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will tend to prevail among Democratic Party politicians and especially
Democratic appointees to executive offices including the Office of the White
House Counsel and the Department of Justice. When a particular party holds
the presidency, the political appointees making decisions about judicial
nominations, as well as the home-state senators of the same party, are likely
to fall into predictable partisan ways on the general subject of religion and
public life.
While we earnestly may hope that such partisan-correlated attitudes are
checked by the judicial role, and that constraints of law should suppress personal preferences in most cases, the strongest of underlying attitudes are
likely to persist, even if subdued. When we add in a legal doctrinal environment that either countenances reliance on such preferences or leaves judges
with little or nothing else on which to draw, then those preexisting preferences may emerge and influence decisionmaking. Thus, the political gap on
Church and State matters in the United States polity may provide a partial
explanation for why judges appointed by presidents of the same party tend
to lean in the same direction when addressing Establishment Clause controversies. Importantly, the partisan or ideological pull on judges can affect
judicial outcomes only if the legal doctrine (or lack thereof) leaves room for
judges to step beyond legal parameters and rely on nonlegal values.
For that reason, the story of political judging by lower federal court
judges in Establishment Clause cases only begins with the saga of the powerful and apparently far-reaching influence of the “God Gap” in American
politics. The story continues as a tragic tale about the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a consistent theory behind the Establishment Clause and
prescribe a coherent set of legal rules or carefully bounded standards that
constrain the discretion of judges when applying that law to the facts in new
cases.
B. The Intolerable Subjectivity of Establishment Clause Doctrine
Even when a judge sincerely wishes to leave his politics at the courtroom door, if he finds no law to apply to a case, the judge still must resolve
the dispute and so must fall back on some nonlegal measure or extralegal
thesis by which to decide the case.169 If the subject is one as controversial,
prominent, and subject to divergent opinion as the role of religion and religious influences in public life, the judge left to draw on nonlegal values will
be hard-pressed not to trend toward his own personal views. As Justice Scalia said in the context of substantive due process, but in words that apply
with equal force to the adjudication of claims under the Establishment
Clause, judges are unlikely to be constrained from political judging by “a

169. Cf. Michael Boudin, Response, A Response to Professor Ramseyer, Predicting
Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences, 58 Duke L.J. 1687, 1688 (2009) (“Policy
often matters in deciding cases, but it is usually policy attributable to Congress or to public
policy reflected in case law, common sense, and the values of the community. [So w]here
exactly should judges look when existing law stops short?”).
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variety of vague ethico-political First Principles whose combined conclusion
can be found to point in any direction the judges favor.”170
Some scholars defend balancing tests and multifactor analytical approaches in constitutional adjudication as preserving the “judgment”
element of the judge’s work, while insisting that such analytical methods are
properly characterized as law and may be applied in a manner distinct from
political value choices. For example, Professor Todd Pettys recently challenged what he calls “the legitimacy dichotomy’s insistence that judges
either apply the clearly expressed will of the sovereign people or commit the
cardinal sin of judging by deciding cases based upon their own personal
preferences.”171 Instead, he maintains, judicial discretion in constitutional
cases “leaves judges with significant room to construct conflicting lines of
argument and still honorably claim that they each are doing ‘law,’ devoid of
reliance upon personal, non-legal premises.”172
At least in the Establishment Clause field, the empirical evidence may
suggest otherwise. Whatever judges may tell themselves when exercising
that broad range of judicial “discretion” left open by ill-defined constitutional doctrine and how ever they may describe the nature of their reasoning
in official opinions, the collective bottom line in Establishment Clause cases
correlates too strongly with personal preferences and political leanings for
any contrary pretense. When “significant room” is opened for judicial discretion, at least in such a highly contested and politically prominent area of
constitutional law as Church and State, judges are likely to end up “rel[ying]
upon personal, non-legal premises.”173 We are skeptical that allotting capacious discretion to judges in resolving such constitutional controversies will,
as Pettys assures us, still “honor the public’s instinctive distinction between
law and politics.”174 Instead, by conferring a wide ambit for judicial discretion in controversial Establishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court offers
judges the constant temptation to engage in that “cardinal sin” of deciding
cases by personal preferences and ideological leanings.
Addressing judicial interpretation of statutory language, Professor Lawrence Solan recently spoke to the concerns of those who prefer “a crisp rule
170. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(addressing whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms should be incorporated against the states through substantive due process). But see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s
Empire 256 (1986) (saying that judges’ “own moral and political convictions” must be “directly engaged” to determine “what the law of their community, properly understood, really
is”); Posner, supra note 73, at 9 (“[L]aw is shot through with politics and with much else
besides that does not fit a legalist model of decision making.”); Richard A. Posner, Response,
Some Realism about Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 Duke L.J. 1177, 1182
(2010) (“[L]aw is suffused with politics (in the ideological rather than the partisan sense . . .).
Constitutional law . . . is political in the sense of being the product not of orthodox legal materials (authoritative text plus precedents) but of the values, political in a broad (but sometimes
in a rather narrow) sense, of the Justices.”).
171. Pettys, supra note 3, at 127.
172. Id. at 142.
173. Id. at 176.
174. Id. at 127.
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of law conveyed in language that we can understand and comply with,” recognizing that “interpretive gaps” allow “the personal values of the individual
judge [to] seep in to the . . . analysis.”175 In most cases of statutory interpretation that reach the courts, Solan maintains that the language is sufficiently
clear and judges are properly sensitive to the judicial role and thus “the residue of unrestrained political judgment is well within tolerable limits.”176 In
modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, by contrast, the capacity for
“unrestrained political judgment” appears to exceed “tolerable limits.”177
1. The Incoherence of the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Professor Steven Gey remarked that the amorphous nature of Establishment Clause doctrine “is best described as a nightmare for lower court
judges trying to ascertain what analysis the Supreme Court wants them to
apply in a particular case.”178 The lower courts have also admitted confusion:
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized there can be
no precise Establishment Clause test capable of ready application, and
therefore has resisted confining such sensitive analyses to “any single test
or criterion.” . . . To the extent the Supreme Court has attempted to prescribe a general analytic framework within which to evaluate
Establishment Clause claims, its efforts have proven ineffective. Indeed,
many believe the Court’s modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in
“hopeless disarray,” and in need of “[s]ubstantial revision.”179

Professor Stephen Smith reports that “[p]robably the most common adjective used in descriptions of the contemporary jurisprudence of religious
freedom is ‘incoherent.’ ”180

175. Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Statutes 3 (2010).
176. Id. at 5.
177. But see Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses:
Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 1131, 1149 (2010) (“The fact that lower courts will reach different conclusions from each other about borderline situations [in
Religion Clause cases] is moderately troubling, but the resulting differential treatment is not a
major social problem, and those raising constitutional claims will certainly prefer occasional
uncertainty to rules that render their claims totally ineffective.”).
178. Steven G. Gey, Religion and the State 293 (2d ed. 2006) (“[S]ome lower
courts have simply thrown up their hands and resorted to applying several different tests in
each case.”).
179. Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 550–51 (10th Cir.
1997) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678–79 (1984); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J. concurring); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
180. Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122
Harv. L. Rev. 1869, 1871 (2009) (reviewing Kent Greenawalt, Discourse in the Dusk
(2008)) (quoting Stephen G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 First Amendment
L. Rev. 1, 4 (2006)).
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For an example of the Supreme Court’s episodic, arguably capricious,
approach to Establishment Clause doctrine, we may look profitably to the
Court’s announcement on the very same day in 2005 of conflicting decisions
on public displays of the Ten Commandments. Given the largely indistinguishable factual circumstances behind these two cases, Professor William
Van Alstyne comments that “[a] more vivid example of the severe doctrinal
schism splintering the Court into factions, and even shards, would be difficult to imagine.”181
First, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,182 the majority in an
opinion by Justice Souter held that the placement of the text of the Ten
Commandments in county courthouses was “an unmistakably religious
statement dealing with religious obligations and with morality subject to
religious sanction.”183 Applying the much-maligned Lemon test,184 the Court
ruled that there was no valid secular purpose to justify the display, even with
the post-lawsuit steps taken by the counties to supplement the display with
other historical American documents.185 Although joining the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote separately to emphasize her alternative
“endorsement” test for the Establishment Clause, concluding that the counties’ display of the Ten Commandments “conveys an unmistakable message
of endorsement [of a set of religious beliefs] to the reasonable observer.”186
Justice Scalia in dissent, joined by three other members of the Court at least
in part, argued that “the Court’s oft repeated assertion that the government
cannot favor religious practice is false” and criticized the majority’s adoption of a “heightened requirement that the secular purpose ‘predominate’
over any purpose to advance religion.”187
Second, in its opinion in Van Orden v. Perry,188 rendered on the same
day as McCreary, the Court accepted a forty-year-old granite monument to
the Ten Commandments on a state’s capitol grounds as consistent with the
Establishment Clause.189 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion for four
members of the Court set aside the Lemon test as “not useful” in resolving
the case, cited the nation’s long history of official recognition of the role of
God and religion in American life, and observed that “acknowledgments of
the role played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation’s heritage are
181. William Van Alstyne, Ten Commandments, Nine Judges, and Five Versions of One
Amendment—The First. (“Now What?”), 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 17, 19 n.10 (2005).
182. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
183. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869.
184. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (setting forth a balancing test for
Establishment Clause cases that evaluates whether the government action (1) has a secular
purpose, (2) has a primary effect that does not advance or inhibit religion, and (3) improperly
fosters an excessive entanglement with religion). For a discussion of the Lemon test, see infra
notes 214–216 and accompanying text.
185. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869–74.
186. Id. at 883–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 885, 901 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
189. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
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common throughout America.”190 Justice Scalia in concurrence echoed his
own dissent in McCreary:
I would prefer to reach the same result by adopting an Establishment
Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation’s past and present
practices, and that can be consistently applied—the central relevant feature
of which is that there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment,
or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.191

Justice Thomas, also writing separately, called for the Court to “return to the
original meaning of the Clause,” under which the Establishment Clause does
not apply to or constrain the states.192
Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote for the majority in Van Orden. He
focused on what he saw as the “context of the display” on the capitol
grounds and concluded that “the context suggests that the State intended the
display’s moral message . . . to predominate” over the religious statement.193
Explaining his shift from disapproval of a Ten Commandments display in
McCreary to acceptance in Van Orden, Justice Breyer said that “the Court
has found no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every case” and declared that in borderline cases there is “no
test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”194
Justice Stevens, who authored the majority opinion in McCreary, was in
the dissent in Van Orden, arguing that “[t]he message transmitted by [the
state’s Ten Commandments] display is quite plain: This State endorses the
divine code of the ‘Judeo-Christian’ God.”195 Justice Souter also dissented,
declaring the following:
[T]he Establishment Clause requires neutrality as a general rule . . . . A
governmental display of an obviously religious text cannot be squared with
neutrality, except in a setting that plausibly indicates that the statement is
not placed in view with a predominant purpose on the part of government
either to adopt the religious message or to urge its acceptance by others.196

Also dissenting, Justice O’Connor reiterated her concurrence in
McCreary,197 which applied an “endorsement” test for the Establishment
Clause.198
Bemoaning the “unintelligibility of this Court’s precedent,” Justice
Thomas warned in Van Orden that, “either in appearance or fact, adjudica-

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 686–88.
Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 701–02 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 699–700.
Id. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 737 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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tion of Establishment Clause challenges turns on judicial predilections.”199
Indeed, fifteen years earlier, Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook predicted that
“[l]ine drawing in this area will be erratic and heavily influenced by the personal views of the judges.”200
The empirical evidence we report in this Article suggests that Establishment Clause–case decisionmaking presents more than the mere
appearance that personal political views influence judging. When judges
plainly are deciding cases in a legal vacuum by inevitable resort to personal
political presuppositions, public faith in the rule of law and the impartiality
of the courts is undermined.201
2. The Need for Higher Law Formality to Depoliticize
Establishment Clause Adjudication
Some degree of judicial discretion is inevitable and often salutary. Even
aside from instances where the law is unavoidably or unfortunately (rather
than intentionally) indeterminate, Professor Pauline Kim explains that “discretion may reflect certain value trade-offs as well: choosing flexibility over
certainty by selecting a standard rather than a bright-line rule; or allocating
certain powers to trial courts, rather than appellate courts, by establishing a
deferential standard of review.”202
Judges engaged in the early stages of articulating law in a novel field or
addressing new statutory questions may need the space opened by discretionary standards 203 to develop better rules over time on the basis of
experience. 204 Fact-intensive questions, such as those presented to trial
courts on both the merits and procedural questions, may best be resolved by
ensuring that judges are able to sculpt fact-specific, circumstantial answers.
199. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring).
200. Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1425 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
201. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 23, 24, 46–
48 (2007) (criticizing aspects of Chief Justice Roberts’s analogy of judging to umpiring while
acknowledging that the “analogy was brilliant because it tapped into a popular, if not dominant, belief in our culture about how judges should perform”—namely, that most Americans
“want their judges to follow the law, wherever it takes them, and not to legislate from the
bench or substitute their personal preferences for those which are embodied in the law”); Lerner & Lund, supra note 4, at 1256 (referring to “the existence of deep popular expectations
about the distinction between law and politics”).
202. Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 388 (2007).
203. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58 (1992) (“A legal directive is ‘standard’-like
when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background
principle or policy to a fact situation.”).
204. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988) (holding that the question of
whether the federal government’s position in litigation lacked “substantial justif[ication]” so
as to be liable for the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees in a case presented “a multifarious and
novel question, little susceptible, for the time being at least, of useful generalization, and likely to profit from the experience that an abuse-of-discretion rule will permit to develop”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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When individual rights are at stake, as in free speech or free exercise of religion cases, judges need the freedom of judgment to investigate the specific
circumstances and analyze the strength of the claim from the bottom up,
because applying categorical rules in such cases may effectively discriminate by mistakenly treating different cases as though they are the same.205
Discretion persists, Kim says, “because social needs demand some measure
of flexibility in the application of legal rules, and because institutional values argue for allocating different types of power between different levels of
the judiciary.”206
In contrast with adaptable case-by-case standards, “rules set a predetermined condition that allows for little discretion [and thereby] generally
provide better ex ante certainty, predictability, and fairness across cases
. . . .”207 Recognizing that perfect determinacy in the law is seldom possible,
rules are still more likely to provide clear guideposts to judges, prevent ad
hoc rationalization, and limit reliance on attitudes or preferences (political,
economic, social, or moral).
Rather than a simple dichotomy, the terms “rules” and “standards” actually describe a continuum. For example, a standard may be defined to
elevate certain factors, exclude other factors, or “attach such fixed weights
to the multiple factors it considers that it resembles a rule.”208 Greater formality may be achieved in a given legal doctrine not only by adoption of
strict rules but also by fortifying the boundaries of standards, crystallizing
the relevant factors, solidifying key elements, and articulating presumptions.
Importantly, when devising or adjusting a rule or a standard, the judge
should look to the direction given by the source of law that confers the power of adjudication on the judge.209
Professor Kathleen Sullivan writes that “the real question is not whether
the Court should exercise discretion in constitutional interpretation, but rather how much and by what means the Court should try to keep its
discretion in check.”210 On what subjects of adjudication should judges be
allowed more freedom of action within the wider parameters of standards
205. See Sisk & Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty, supra note 8, at 56–57 (suggesting that in religious free exercise cases where empirical evidence shows a disadvantage for
Muslim claimants, “individuated analysis, while resisting categorical generalizations . . . may
advance more equitable and properly differentiated treatment of each religious claimant, Muslim or otherwise”).
206. Kim, supra note 202, at 442.
207. Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1, 15–20
(2011) (addressing the comparative benefits and costs of standards versus rules); see also
Sullivan, supra note 203, at 58 (“A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a decisionmaker
to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.”).
208. Sullivan, supra note 203, at 61.
209. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1183–84 (1989) (“[T]he extent to which one can elaborate general rules from a statutory or
constitutional command depends considerably upon how clear and categorical one understands the command to be, which in turn depends considerably upon one’s method of textual
exegesis.”).
210. Sullivan, supra note 203, at 57.
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and on what matters should judges be more tightly constrained by the prescription of rules? When are standards or balancing tests211 appropriate; how
much discretion should be allocated in such areas; which factors are legitimately weighed in the balance; what comparative weights among those
factors are most fitting; and what signals should alert the reviewing court to
an abuse of that discretion? What positive values might be promoted by curtailing discretion? And what negative effects are exacerbated by continuing
discretion?
Discretion may be unavoidable and even healthy in a legal system but,
as Cass Sunstein says, “a legal system can certainly make choices about
how much discretion it wants various people to have.”212 And Sunstein continues, “[T]he choice between rules and rulelessness [often should be made]
on the basis of a contextual inquiry into the aggregate level of likely errors
and abuses.”213
In its 1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman,214 the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for determining whether a government has violated the
Establishment Clause: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” 215 As Professor Michael
Paulsen has lamented, “[T]he ambiguity of the test left the Court leeway to
interpret each prong in various ways, producing a bewildering patchwork of
decisions as the justices engaged in a tug-of-war over the interpretation of
the test.”216
In “the area of religious freedom,” Professor Thomas Berg advises that
“balancing and case by case decisionmaking hold particular dangers.”217 As
Berg explains, “Religion is a matter on which people, judges included, tend
to have gut feelings that often are inarticulate but nevertheless can powerfully affect their outlooks.” 218 Indeed, Professor Michael McConnell once
attributed “[m]uch of the incoherence” of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine “to the Justices’ assumption in particular cases that
they understand the proper relation between church and culture, and to read
that understanding into the Constitution.”219

211. See id. at 57 (explaining that balancing tests correspond to standards).
212. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 953, 960 (1995).
213. Id. at 1012.
214. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
215. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)).
216. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 795, 801 (1993).
217. Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 701
(1997).
218. Id.
219. Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 191, 221 (1992).
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For these reasons, as Berg says, “[c]ase by case, intuitive judgments
about [religion clause] matters are likely to be unacceptably subjective.”220
Other scholars also have protested that “[b]alancing tests are notoriously
subjective”221 and, in this particular field of law, “leave[] in the judiciary far
too much unguided discretion that was never conferred [by the text of the
Establishment Clause].”222
In certain areas, the benefits of more determinate rules or regulated
standards outweigh the costs incurred by removing the freedom of movement that judges enjoy under broader discretionary standards. Prescription
of rules for judges is more likely to force extralegal factors and personal
attitudes out of bounds. In a study of Voting Rights Act litigation in the federal courts of appeals, Professors Adam Cox and Thomas Miles found that
“ideological divisions in judicial voting patterns are more pronounced in the
standard-like second step [of the doctrinal sequential framework for determining unlawful vote dilution] than in the evaluation of the more rule-like
factors [at the first stage.]”223 Accordingly, their findings “indicate that rules
indeed may, to a greater extent than standards, limit discretion and suppress
ideological disagreement among judges.”224
As Kim says, where a particular legal directive in a particular field of
law should fall on the continuum between open-ended standards and fixed
rules “is essentially an argument about the values served or defeated by
permitting discretion.”225 Elevating the impartiality of the judiciary and reducing the influence of extralegal attitudes should, we submit, be given
some priority among those values. When an important and visible realm of
adjudication has become infected with political judging, the cure may well

220. Berg, supra note 217, at 701.
221. Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Public Legal Reason, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill
Rts. J. 7, 22 (2006).
222. Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment
Clause Interpretation, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 489, 621–22.
223. Cox & Miles, supra note 81, at 1495; see also Robert C. Longstreth, Does the TwoProng Test For Determining Applicability of the Discretionary Function Exception Provide
Guidance to Lower Courts Sufficient to Avoid Judicial Partisanship?, U. St. Thomas L.J.
(forthcoming 2011) (finding no substantial difference between Republican- and Democraticappointed federal appellate judges in applying explicit first prong of test for discretionary
function exception to Federal Tort Claims Act, but finding that Democratic-appointed judges
rejected application of exception by a rate nearly three times higher than Republicanappointed judges on the indefinite second prong).
224. Cox & Miles, supra note 81, at 1537; see also Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller,
Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 326, 326–27 (2007) (“[W]e model a judicial hierarchy where political control is exercised by higher courts over lower courts
through the choice between determinate doctrines (highly specified, rule-like directives) and
indeterminate doctrines (weakly specified, standard-like directives).”).
225. Kim, supra note 202, at 416.
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require withdrawing or reducing discretion and heightening the formality of
the governing adjudicatory regime.226
3. Restoring the “Classic Legal Tug”227 in
Establishment Clause Cases
In a recent succinct essay, which speaks directly to judicial enforcement
of the Establishment Clause, Professor Richard Garnett asks the following
question:
Even if “the rule of law” is not only a “law of rules,” is it troubling to think
that resolving disputes about matters so important and basic as the place of
religion in public life, and the connections and boundaries between religious and political authorities, depends on the deployment of imperfect,
incomplete doctrine by judges who will not always be as learned and sensible to “complex, often conflicting values” [that are identified by scholars
as reflected in the Establishment Clause]?228

Suggesting that “the better course is to find (somehow) some bright-line,
on-off ‘rules’ and ‘tests,’ ”229 Garnett argues “not only that judges should be
deferential—applying a ‘rule of clear mistake’—when evaluating legislative
action in light of the establishment clause, but that they should settle for constructing and enforcing only those clear and straightforwardly administrable
rules that are essential to vindicating the clause’s core, clear meaning and
guarantees.”230
In our study, we included precedent variables to explore whether the Supreme Court’s tightening of doctrine in the Establishment Clause field may

226. Cf. Cox & Miles, supra note 81, at 1525 (finding empirical results “consistent with
the prediction that ideological disagreements will be more intense under standards than
rules”).
227. See Cross, supra note 24, at 200; see also Sisk, supra note 156, at 896 (“Empirical
scholarship can show us where the judicial system is reasonably effective in exerting a ‘classic
legal tug’ against personal judicial preferences or attitudes, and where it falters.”).
228. Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Enforcement of the Establishment Clause, 25 Const.
Comm. 273, 274 (2008) (footnote omitted) (referring to Kent Greenawalt’s statement that “the
[religion] clauses reflect such complex, often conflicting, values, that no tests can do them
justice” (quoting 2 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution 52 (2008))).
229. Id. at 277; see also Solum, supra note 221, at 15–16, 22 (arguing that “pluralism—
religious and moral division—gives us reason to affirm an ideal of public legal reason that is
best instantiated in the practice of legal formalism,” such that judges would “resolve cases on
the basis of legal texts without reference to underlying values” by applying such factors as
precedent, plain meaning, structure, original meaning, and general default rules).
230. Garnett, supra note 228, at 275 (footnote omitted); see also Thomas B. Griffith,
Essay, Was Bork Right About Judges?, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 157, 165 (2011) (referring
to “judicial humility” as “an indispensable temperament for a judge in our system”). But see
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1840 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the Establishment Clause context, we do not accord any special deference to the legislature on account of
its generic advantages as a policymaking body, and the purpose test is not ‘satisfied so long as
any secular purpose for the government action is apparent’ ” (quoting McCreary Cnty. v.
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 865 n.13 (2005) (emphasis added))).
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constrain judicial discretion and suppress political judging. By adopting
what we believe may prove to be a new “jurisprudential regime”231 for adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges for government aid for
religious persons or institutions, the Supreme Court may be shifting away
from nondeferential and open-ended balancing and moving toward more
rule-like guideposts in combination with deference to the political branches.
As explained below, we find that the Court’s recalibration of Establishment
Clause doctrine has made a measurable difference in outcomes in the lower
federal courts but has not (yet) reduced political or ideological disparities
among ruling judges in the lower federal courts.
In Agostini v. Felton,232 the Supreme Court overruled two prior decisions
and approved aid to students in religious schools when “allocated on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and
is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.” 233 Overturning its own prior decision in that very
ongoing line of litigation along with a companion decision,234 the Supreme
Court ruled that the government could offer remedial education to students
who attend religious school by providing public schoolteachers to teach after hours in those religious school classrooms.235 No longer would school
districts be required to take expensive and awkward steps to remove such
public remedial instruction to off-campus sites in order to avoid supposed
excessive entanglement with religion.236
Professors Mark Richards and Herbert Kritzer postulate that the Supreme Court establishes legal directives through a “jurisprudential
regime”—that is, “a key precedent, or a set of related precedents, that structures the way in which the Supreme Court justices evaluate key elements of
cases in arriving at decisions in a particular legal area.”237 Professors Barry
Friedman and Andrew Martin similarly describe “Law” in the Supreme
Court as “serv[ing] what we might call a ‘channeling’ function rather than a
‘constraining’ one,” in which the Court uses legal doctrine to “organize[] the
decision of future cases.”238 Kritzer and Richards applied that concept to the
Supreme Court’s Lemon test239 for the Establishment Clause in an empirical
study which found that, while not dictating outcomes in a mechanical way,
231. See Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme
Court Decision Making, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 305 (2002). For more on jurisprudential regimes, see infra notes 237–251 and accompanying text.
232. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
233. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231.
234. The two decisions overruled were Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
235. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 218–36.
236. Id. at 230.
237. Richards & Kritzer, supra note 231, at 308.
238. Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places:
Some Suggestions for Modeling Legal Decision-Making, in What’s Law Got to Do with
It? 143, 146 (Charles Geyh ed., 2011).
239. On the Lemon test, see supra notes 214–216 and accompanying text.

Sisk & Heise FTP 5_B.doc

May 2012]

3/27/2012 9:21 AM

Ideology “All the Way Down”?

1255

the Lemon regime “served to provide a framework for the decisions in Establishment Clause cases decided over the last 30 years.”240
According to Richards and Kritzer, the “key to validating the existence
of jurisprudential regimes is change by the Supreme Court in basic factors
associated with decision making in a particular legal area.”241 Because our
study is focused on the lower federal courts, we have not applied the
Kritzer–Richards statistical methodology to verify that the Supreme Court
itself has embraced the Agostini decision as a “jurisprudential regime
change,” which would be revealed by shifts in the patterns of factors used or
discounted by the Court in structuring subsequent Establishment Clause
decisions.242 However, looking both at the definitive change articulated by
the Court in the Agostini decision itself and the impact of that change on the
lower federal courts as found in our study, Agostini may be a game changer
or at least a substantial step in that direction.
First, the Supreme Court in Agostini clearly announced a change by explicitly overruling two prior decisions as “no longer good law.”243 While the
Court did not wholly abandon the Lemon test, the Agostini decision set narrower bounds on that balancing approach by declaring that one set of factors
no longer created a presumption of an Establishment Clause violation and
two other factors strongly supported the validity of government interaction
with religion or religious institutions. A plurality of the Court later described
these changes: “In Agostini . . . we brought some clarity to our case law, by
overruling two anomalous precedents (one in whole, the other in part) and
by consolidating some of our previously disparate considerations under a
revised test.”244
In Agostini, the Court rejected prior presumptions that (1) placing public
employees on parochial school grounds has the impermissible effect of advancing religion because those public employees would be “tempted to
inculcate religion” and (2) administrative cooperation between public authorities and religious schools confirmed an excessive entanglement
between government and religion.245 Moreover, the Court articulated new
presumptions that neutrality and equality in providing government aid
were major steps toward avoiding constitutional infirmity. The Court emphasized that the government aid at issue was distributed pursuant to
secular, nonreligious criteria and was provided on equal terms to religious
240. Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, Research Note, Jurisprudential Regimes
and Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37
Law & Soc’y Rev. 827, 839 (2003).
241. Richards & Kritzer, supra note 231, at 309.
242. See Kritzer & Richards, supra note 240, at 833–38; Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J.
Richards, Taking and Testing Jurisprudential Regimes Seriously: A Response to Lax and Rader, 72 J. Pol. 285 (2010) (explaining statistical testing for jurisprudential regime shift).
243. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209, 236 (1997).
244. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000) (plurality opinion).
245. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222–35; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality opinion)
([O]ur cases had pared somewhat the factors that could justify a finding of excessive entanglement.”).
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and secular beneficiaries.246 When government aid is provided equally to
all beneficiaries on religiously neutral terms, the Court stated that “the aid
is less likely to have the effect of advancing religion” and thus is more
likely to be upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge.247 In sum,
the Court held, “our Establishment Clause law has ‘significant[ly]
change[d]’ since” the earlier decision now overruled.248
Many religion clause scholars suggest that the Agostini decision and its
progeny have provided greater stability to the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause doctrine, at least on questions of government aid, even if that change
in course came late and still more ballast is needed. Professor Michael
McConnell describes “the trajectory toward a ‘neutrality’ interpretation of the
Establishment Clause” as having been interrupted by the two decisions that
were overruled by Agostini, decisions that had “greatly confus[ed] the doctrinal picture.” 249 Professor Thomas Berg cites the “unbroken string of
decisions approving particular forms of aid since the early 1980s,” including
Agostini’s overruling of “separationist decisions from the 1970s,” as setting
a “trend [that] is obviously away from separation and toward a principle of
treating religious entities equally in evaluating aid.”250 Noting the Court’s
increasing focus on “equality as the lodestar of Establishment Clause decisions involving funding questions,” Professor Paul Horwitz suggests that
“[i]t is fair to say . . . that the caselaw in this area is more stable now than it
has been for some time, and less controversial.”251
Second, Agostini has produced a measurable change in the response of
lower federal courts to Establishment Clause claims arising after 1997. In
our model of Establishment Clause cases that includes Party of Appointing
President as the ideology proxy variable, the Agostini precedent variable is
statistically significant at the .05 level.252 In our alternative model with
246. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231.
247. See id.; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810, 813 (plurality opinion) (describing the
“principles of neutrality and private choice” as the two “primary criteri[a]” for determining the
validity of government aid against an Establishment Clause challenge).
248. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237.
249. Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court’s Emerging Consensus
on the Line between Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 681,
689 (2001).
250. Thomas C. Berg, Race Relations and Modern Church-State Relations, 43 B.C. L.
Rev. 1009, 1023 n.95 (2002).
251. Paul Horwitz, The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution xv
n.22 (2011).
252. We also included a precedent variable for the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648, 653 (2002), which upheld as “neutral” a
school voucher program that allowed poor children in failing public schools to choose educational alternatives including private religious schools. The Zelman precedent variable did not
approach statistical significance. We postulate that, while Zelman may have been the culmination of the Court’s shift to a neutrality approach for government aid in Establishment Clause
cases, the doctrinal heavy lifting had already been accomplished in Agostini. Thus, the lower
court judges may have already readjusted their responses to Establishment Clause claims and
did not need to significantly recalibrate those responses after Zelman.
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Common Space Scores as the ideology proxy, the Agostini variable slips out
of significance but barely so (to slightly above the .06 level) as not to undermine the salience of this finding.
Holding all other independent variables constant in our Party of Appointing President model, our best estimate is that the success rate for
Establishment Clause claimants fell from 53.0%253 to 35.8%254 with the intervention of the Supreme Court’s Agostini precedent. However, we
acknowledge that there is greater uncertainty about the magnitude of the
size effect for the Agostini variable, given that the 95% confidence intervals
for the two predictions do overlap.255
Figure 7.
Predicted Probability of Success for Establishment Clause Claims,
Before and After AGOSTINI V. FELTON (1996–2005)

253. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before Agostini ranges from
36.6% to 69.4%. On 95% confidence intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
254. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate after Agostini ranges from
30.1% to 41.5%.
255. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, even among many statisticians, the overlap of
the 95 percent confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities of success before and after
Agostini does not mean that the Agostini variable lacks a statistically significant correlation at
the .05 level with the outcome dependent variable in our Party-of-Appointing-President model. Even with the confidence intervals overlapping, the probability is well below 5 percent that
the actual predicted success value before Agostini lies in the very lower bottom of that interval
and, simultaneously, the actual predicted success value after Agostini lies in the very top of
that interval. See Peter C. Austin & Janet E. Hux, A Brief Note on Overlapping Confidence
Intervals, 36 J. Vascular Surgery 194, 194 (2002); see also Epstein, Martin & Schneider,
supra note 57, at 1815 n.12 (“[W]hile the confidence intervals for these two predictions overlap, there is still a statistically significant difference between the predictions.”).
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Subject to that caution, our best estimate points to a substantial margin
of 17 percent between the rates of favorable judicial response to Establishment Clause claims in the lower federal courts before and after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Agostini. That translates into nearly a one-third decline
in the success rate for claimants. While a change in outcomes overall is
hardly the only way to measure the impact of a new Supreme Court precedent, our findings do confirm that the Court’s adjustment of doctrine has
made a difference, even in a field of adjudication that has been notoriously
difficult to manage.
Unfortunately, while Agostini may have flattened the overall success rate
for Establishment Clause claims generally, that precedent has not (yet) muted the political influences on outcomes in the lower federal courts. Indeed,
the period following the Agostini decision has witnessed a widening of the
gulf between Republican-appointed and Democratic-appointed judges in
response to Establishment Clause claims.
In Figure 8, we chart the predicted probability of a favorable ruling on
an Establishment Clause claim by Party of Appointing President over two
successive ten-year periods—the period of 1986–1995 (the subject of our
prior study of religious liberty decisions) and the period of 1996–2005 (the
subject of our present study). Because the two data sets employ somewhat
different models (as we refined the variables for the most recent study period and included digested as well as published opinions), the comparisons
are not exact. Moreover, we cannot readily combine the data so as to pivot
the comparison precisely at the June 23, 1997 date of the Agostini decision,
although we compare two equivalent ten-year time periods. For the 1986–
1995 time period, all of the judicial observations of course predate Agostini,
while for the 1996–2005 time period, 85.6 percent of the judicial observations postdate Agostini, thus allowing us to roughly capture trends before
and after this landmark precedent.
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Figure 8.
Predicted Probability of Positive Vote by Judge on Establishment
Clause Claim, by Party of Appointing President and by Time Period
(1986–1995 and 1996–2005)

As illustrated in Figure 8, when holding all other independent variables
constant, the predicted probability of a positive ruling on Establishment
Clause claims by Republican-appointed judges fell substantially between
the two periods, from a rate of 34.4%256 during the 1986–1995 period to a
rate of only 25.4%257 during the 1996–2005 period. But for Democraticappointed judges, the predicted probability of a favorable ruling on an
Establishment Clause claim actually increased from the pre-Agostini
period to the primarily post-Agostini period, although only slightly from a
rate of 53.3%258 during the 1986–1995 period to a rate of 57.3%259 during
the 1996–2005 period.260
256. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Republicanappointed judge in the 1986–1995 data set ranged from 26.0% to 42.7%. On 95% confidence
intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
257. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Republicanappointed judge in the 1996–2005 data set ranged from 19.5% to 31.3%.
258. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Democraticappointed judge in the 1986–1995 data set ranged from 41.1% to 65.4%.
259. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Democraticappointed judge in the 1996–2005 data set ranged from 42.4% to 72.1%.
260. Nor has the political difference faded even in the particular context of education, in
which the Agostini case arose. In a forthcoming article focused on religious liberty claims (under
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses) that arose in public or private elementary and
secondary schools, we find that a Republican-appointed judge is predicted to vote in a proreligion direction at a rate of 59.0%, while the probability for a Democratic-appointed judge is
30.1%—a difference of nearly two-fold. Heise & Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decisionmaking, supra note 8.
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The diverging margin in success rates for Establishment Clause claims
before judges appointed by presidents of the two parties spread from 18.9%
to 31.9% between these two periods. Between 1986 and 1995, an Establishment Clause claimant had about a one-and-a-half times greater
likelihood of prevailing before a Democratic-appointed judge than before a
Republican-appointed one. By 1996 to 2005, that higher likelihood of success before a Democratic-appointed as compared to a Republican-appointed
judge had grown to two-and-a-quarter times.
In sum, the political gulf on Establishment Clause outcomes in the lower
federal courts is growing, despite the intended clarifying effect of Agostini.
Some might argue that the source of that expanding gap appears to be on the
Republican side, where a more pronounced drop in favorable responses to
such claims has emerged between the two studied time periods, while the
response of Democratic-appointed judges has remained more stable during
these two time periods. But that interpretation fails to account for the expectation that Establishment Clause-claim success rates in the lower federal courts
presumably should be falling in light of developments in Supreme Court Establishment Clause precedent, while Democratic-appointed judges instead
have been moving in the opposite direction. On the one hand, perhaps judges
appointed to the federal bench by more recent Republican presidents, such as
President George W. Bush (see Figure 6), may have increasingly favorable
attitudes toward religion in public life. On the other hand, perhaps Republican
appointees have been more faithful in following the Supreme Court’s change
in course on Church and State matters, reflected in cases such as Agostini,
while Democratic appointees have been reluctant to follow suit and confer
greater deference to the political branches on the propriety and form of public acknowledgment of or interaction with religion (see Figure 7). Most
likely, the answer lies somewhere in between. In any event, the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine continues to afford ample room for
political judging.
***
If, as Professor Frederick Schauer writes, “values [that] often go by the
name of the Rule of Law” include “predictability of result, uniformity of
treatment (treating like cases alike), and fear of granting unfettered discretion to individual decision-makers even if they happen to be wearing black
robes,”261 then Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not advance the rule
of law. To defend the rule of law and insist that the Supreme Court develop
doctrine in a manner that sets meaningful, and meaningfully legal, guideposts for future decisions, one need not subscribe to what Brian Leiter

261. Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer 35 (2009). But see id. at 195
(“[S]ome Rule of Law values are served by precise, predictable, and understandable rules,
[while] others are served by relatively open-ended standards that will allow judges and other
official decision-makers the discretion to do justice in the individual case.”).
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rightly characterizes as “Vulgar Formalism,”262 or what Professors Frank
Cross and Blake Nelson similarly describe as the “naïve legal model.”263
By any account of a legal model—vulgar, naïve, sophisticated, or refined—the Supreme Court’s collective approach to Establishment Clause
cases fails to satisfy. By neglecting to provide sufficient direction to the
lower federal courts, either by prescription of objective rules or articulation
of legal standards that can be weighed and applied other than by political
metrics, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence adds up to
a case of judicial malpractice.
Conclusion
For legal scholars such as ourselves who adhere to impartiality in judging as an aspirational ideal and view the rule of law as demanding
something more than political policy choices made by lawyers in robes, the
ineluctable conclusion that the outcomes of Establishment Clause cases in
federal court are determined more by ideology than any other factor might
be seen as a cause for despair. As long-time observers of the federal courts,
we have maintained our confidence that federal judges sincerely and with
substantial success strip themselves of political allegiances and ideological
presuppositions and suffuse themselves in a legal environment.264 Given the
results of our study, our critics are likely to see our stubborn insistence on
the possibility of law-based, nonpolitical judging, even in the face of such
powerful empirical evidence, as wishful thinking or further proof of our naïveté.
We acknowledge that law is not perfectly determinate in every case, that
judicial discretion is inevitable and even healthy in appropriate circumstances and when encircled by legal boundaries, and that judges are human
beings who bring their life experiences and general perspectives to the task.
At the same time, we agree with Professor Brian Tamanaha that “excessive
skepticism about judging” itself becomes deleterious:
No one thinks that law is autonomous and judging is mechanical deduction, and rare is the informed jurist who thinks that judges are engaged in
the single-minded pursuit of their personal preferences . . . . There is a vast

262. Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 16 Legal
Theory 111, 111 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing “Vulgar Formalism”
as the “idea that judicial decision-making involves nothing more than mechanical deduction
on the model of the syllogism” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
263. Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1437, 1437 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf.
Edwards & Livermore, supra note 159, at 1916 (“Deciding cases according to law and precedent, rather than personal political or ideological predilections, does not require judges to
embrace the simpler and less defensible view that law absolutely dictates outcomes.”).
264. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of
Politics in Judging 118–19 (2010) (“For legally oriented judges, the law is not chains or
ropes they are trying to wriggle out of but rather guideposts they are actively searching for and
following to reach their destination.”).
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difference in operation and consequences between a system that instructs
judges to “Decide what you think right” and one that instructs judges to
“Decide in accordance with the law.” There is a vast difference between
individual judges who decide cases in terms of the outcome they prefer,
manipulating the legal rules to justify that outcome, and judges who strive
to produce the legally correct decision.265

Viewed across the larger landscape of judging in the lower federal
courts, the empirical evidence does not direct a verdict that ideology has
supplanted the legal model. Studies that explore large numbers of cases in a
diverse array of subject-matter fields have not found that “any extralegal
factor—ideology, judicial background, strategic reaction to other institutions, the nature of litigants, or the makeup of appellate panels—explains
more than a very small part of the variation in outcomes.”266 As Professor
Frank Cross summed up from his comprehensive study of federal appellate
judges, while ideology does sometimes correlate with judicial behavior, “the
measured effect size for ideology is always a fairly small one.”267
Even in our present study, which involves a politically sensitive and publicly prominent field of constitutional law, party and ideology are not perfect
predictors of outcomes in Establishment Clause cases in the lower federal
courts.268 We stand by our previous summation: “The growing body of empirical research on the lower federal courts . . . reveals that ideology
explains only a relatively modest part of judicial behavior and emerges on
the margins in controversial and ideologically contested cases.”269
None of this should distract our attention from the glaring partisan dichotomy that has emerged in Establishment Clause cases decided in the
lower federal courts. Indeed, as Tamanaha rightly admonishes, it is prudent
not to exaggerate the political nature of judging precisely so that we can
“sound a genuine alarm when judges truly are deciding in a highly political
fashion.”270
Unfortunately, in its Establishment Clause rulings, the Supreme Court
has failed to clearly define its reasoning in majority opinions, revealed a

265. Id. at 197.
266. Sisk, supra note 156, at 877; see also Cross, supra note 24, at 9, 28, 165–68, 228–
29 (finding in a comprehensive study of federal appellate decision-making that ideology was a
weaker influence than legal factors); Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom
Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 Md. L. Rev. 841, 856–57
(2006) (finding no significant ideological influence in a study of all nonunanimous cases decided by one federal circuit over a several-year period).
267. Cross, supra note 24, at 38.
268. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science and Humility 13–14 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 09-11, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1393362 (“The relationship between ‘law’ and ‘judicial politics’ may be obscured
by the occasional failure of scholars to confine descriptions of their results, and their claims,
to the judges, courts and cases in fact studied. . . .”).
269. Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 746.
270. Tamanaha, supra note 264, at 152.
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multiplicity of theoretical approaches in a multitude of opinions that do not
coalesce into a single theme, fostered uncertainties about legitimate sources
for discerning the governing legal rules, and frequently offered vague generalities rather than articulating clear standards for adjudication. In this way,
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence invites even the
most conscientious of judges to draw deeply on personal reactions to religious symbols and political attitudes about religious influence on public
institutions or policies. Sadly, the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine has
become an attractive nuisance for political judging.
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